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UNLOCKING THE “VIRTUAL CAGE” OF 
WILDLIFE SURVEILLANCE 
  HENRY LININGER† AND TOM LININGER†† 
ABSTRACT 
The electronic surveillance of wildlife has grown more extensive 
than ever.  For instance, thousands of wolves wear collars transmitting 
signals to wildlife biologists.  Some collars inject wolves with 
tranquilizers that allow for their immediate capture if they stray outside 
of the boundaries set by anthropocentric management policies.  Hunters 
have intercepted the signals from surveillance collars and have used this 
information to track and slaughter the animals.  While the ostensible 
reason for the surveillance programs is to facilitate the peaceful 
coexistence of humanity and wildlife, the reality is less benign—an 
outdoor version of Bentham’s Panopticon. 
This Article reconceptualizes the enterprise of wildlife surveillance. 
Without suggesting that animals have standing to assert constitutional 
rights, the Article posits a public interest in protecting the privacy of 
wildlife.  The very notion of wildness implies privacy.  The law already 
protects the bodily integrity of animals to some degree, and a protected 
zone of privacy is penumbral to this core protection, much the same way 
that human privacy emanates from narrower guarantees against 
government intrusion. 
Policy implications follow that are akin to the rules under the 
Fourth Amendment limiting the government’s encroachment on human 
privacy.  Just as the police cannot install a wiretap without demonstrating 
a particularized investigative need for which all less intrusive methods 
would be insufficient, so too should surveillance of wildlife necessitate a 
specific showing of urgency.  A detached, neutral authority should 
review all applications for electronic monitoring of wildlife.  Violations 
of the rules should result in substantial sanctions.  The Article concludes 
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by considering—and refuting—foreseeable objections to heightened 
requirements for the surveillance of wildlife. 
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INTRODUCTION 
What distinguishes wildlife from other forms of life?  The sine qua 
non of wildlife is freedom from domination.  To be sure, humans are 
capable of subjugating animals in a variety of ways.  But when a human 
exercises dominion over an animal, the animal is no longer “wild” in 
any meaningful sense.1  Wildness is what separates an autonomous 
creature in nature from a house cat or a dairy cow. 
 
 
 1. Martin Drenthen, a professor of environmental philosophy in the Netherlands, uses the 
term “wild” to describe “species that have their own agency, that cannot fully be controlled.”  
Martin Drenthen, The Return of the Wild in the Anthropocene: Wolf Resurgence in the 
Netherlands, 18 ETHICS, POL’Y & ENVT. 318, 318–19 (2015) (discussing human reaction to the 
return of wild wolves in the Netherlands); accord Reed Elizabeth Loder, Toward Reconciling 
Environmental and Animal Ethics: Northeast Wolf Reintroduction, 10 J. ANIMAL & NATURAL 
RESOURCE LAW 95, 127 (2014) (“Something wild is largely free of human control and able to 
carry out the activities suited to its nature relatively unimpeded.”). 
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One clear line of demarcation is freedom of movement.  Wild 
animals are free to roam.  Animals in cages or enclosures lack this 
freedom. The constraint of their movement extinguishes their wild-
ness.  An altruistic reason for the constraint does not change the fact 
of captivity.2  Zoos are to wildness what prisons are to freedom.3 
A more difficult question of taxonomy has arisen since humans 
started affixing surveillance devices to wild animals.  According to 
Professor Etienne Benson at the University of Pennsylvania, 
“American wildlife biologists incorporated Cold War-era surveillance 
technologies into their practices in order to render wild animals and 
their habitats legible and manageable.”4  Among other strategies, 
biologists have trapped wild animals and outfitted them with telemetry 
collars.5  The collars have grown more sophisticated over time and now 
collect extensive data about metabolic changes as well as movement.6  
Animals wearing these collars cannot escape the watchful eyes of their  
monitors.7 Over 10,000 creatures currently wear electronic trans-
mitters of some sort.8 
 
 2. Richard Posner, Animal Rights, 110 YALE L. J. 527, 539 (2001) (suggesting that even 
when the enclosure of an animal amounts to “protective custody,” it is still “the antithesis of 
freedom.”). 
 3. Holly Doremus, Biodiversity and the Challenge of Saving the Ordinary, 38 IDAHO L. 
REV.  325, 338 (2002) (arguing that by confining animals in zoos or their functional equivalents, 
we are “giving up the wildness of nature and the ability of species to pursue their own evolutionary 
destiny.”). 
 4. Etienne Benson, The Wired Wilderness: Electronic Surveillance and Environmental 
Values in Wildlife Biology, PhD dissertation at MIT, 2 (2008) (tracing the evolution of wildlife 
surveillance in the U.S. and around the world).  Benson’s thesis evolved into a book, WIRED 
WILDERNESS: TECHNOLOGIES OF TRACKING AND THE MAKING OF MODERN WILDLIFE 2 
(Johns Hopkins University Press 2010). 
 5. Caleb Price, SMART Collars Reveal the Hidden Lives of Wolves, U.S. NATIONAL PARK 
SERVICE (2015), www.nps.gov/articles/denali-smart-collars.htm (last accessed on July 7, 2016). 
 6. Id.  (“The SMART (Species Movement, Acceleration, and Radio Tracking) collar . . . 
simultaneously measures the geographic location, behavior, and physiology of the animal wearing 
it.”); Bethany Augiliere, Beyond GPS: The Next High-Tech Frontier in Wild Animal Tracking, 
SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, Dec. 30, 2015 (noting that these sophisticated collars keep track of all 
wolves’ activities).  Biology Professor Terri Williams at U.C. Santa Cruz explained to the New 
York Times that the collars allow biologists to monitor all aspects of the animals’ daily routine.  
Kirk Johnson, ‘Smart Collar’ in the Works to Manage Wildlife Better, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2011 
(“What you end up with is a diary for the animal, a 24-hour diary that says he spent this much 
time sleeping, and we know from the GPS where that was . . .Then he woke up and went for a 
walk over here.  He caught something over here.  He ate something and we know what it was 
because the signatures we get for a deer kill vs. a rabbit kill are very different.”). 
 7. See Kirk Johnson, ‘Smart Collar’ in the Works to Manage Wildlife Better, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 30, 2011. 
 8. According to Professor Terry Tempest Williams, the Tanner Scholar in Environmental 
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When an animal is subject to unrelenting surveillance of its 
location, diet and physiological reactions to external stimuli, is the 
animal still wild? The modern use of surveillance collars—some of 
which administer tranquilizers9 or shocks10 if animals travel too far—
restricts the freedom of animals by “erect[ing] a virtual cage” around 
them, according to Holly Doremus, a professor of environmental law 
at Berkeley.11  The surveillance collar itself is a draconian device that 
French philosopher Gilles Deleuze associated with nightmarish 
“societies of control.”12  A New York Times column on the new high-
tech strategies for wildlife management described “operations that 
read like science fiction about humans trapped in a game reserve 
managed by alien overlords.”13  The historical view of animals as 
soulless, subordinate species14 might abide such treatment, but the 
 
Humanities at the University of Utah, “[t]ens of thousands of animals in the United States are 
numbered and scanned, then monitored through biological surveillance.”  TERRY TEMPEST 
WILLIAMS, FINDING BEAUTY IN A BROKEN WORLD 113 (Vintage 2009). 
 9. Holly Doremus, Restoring Endangered Species: The Importance of Being Wild, 23 HARV. 
ENVT’L L. REV. 1, 60 (1999) (reporting that U.S. Department of Interior “routinely installs 
monitoring devices such as radio-equipped collars on reintroduced animals, monitoring the 
population to ensure that it stays within a designated area . . . Interior agreed to fit the wolves 
with ‘capture collars’ designed to deliver a sedative dose in response to a radio signal”); see also 
INTERNATIONAL WOLF CENTER, www.wolf.org/programs/educator-resources-wolf-link/track-
wild-wolves/ (last accessed July 7, 2016) (“These special radio collars can also be equipped with 
darts holding a tranquilizer, which can be triggered from a distance.  This allows researchers to 
easily recapture an animal.”). 
 10. Candace Gaukel Andrews, a columnist for the World Wildlife Fund, has reported that 
wildlife managers have designed wolf collars that can give painful shocks if the wolves stray 
outside of approved areas.  Candace Gaukel Andrews, Traditional Tracking vs. Electronic 
Surveillance: Has Wildlife Management Become Too High-Tech?, April 2, 2013, 
www.goodnature.nathab.com/traditional-tracking-vs.-electronic-surveillance-has-wildlife-
research-become-too-high-tech/  (last accessed on July 7, 2016) (“But wildlife radio tracking has 
created concerns as well as capabilities; it has provided opportunities for connection as well as for 
control.  It’s been reported, for instance, that shock collars have been tested on wolves.  When 
the wolves tried to roam beyond a fence of sensors controlled by satellite, they were shocked.”). 
 11. Doremus, supra note 9, at 60 (“These direct control measures erect a virtual cage around 
the animals, converting them from wild creatures into semidomesticated ones.”). 
 12. Giles Deleuze, Postscript on the Societies of Control, OCTOBER 3, 7 (Winter 1992) (“The 
conception of a control mechanism, giving the position of any element within an open 
environment at any given instant (whether animal in a reserve or human in a corporation, as with 
an electronic collar), is not necessarily one of science fiction.”). 
 13. Daniel Duane, The Unnatural Kingdom: If Technology Helps Us Save the Wilderness, 
Will the Wilderness Be Wild?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2016 (describing wildlife management strategy 
involving surveillance collars and forced movement). 
 14. See, e.g., IMMANUEL KANT, LECTURES ON ETHICS, Louis Infield, trans., 239 (The 
Century Co. 1930) (“Animals are not self-conscious and are there merely as a means to an end.  
That end is man.”) Kant could tolerate cruel practices such as vivisection because of they are 
valuable to man.  “Vivisectionists, who use living animals for the experiments, certainly act 
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modern naturalist despairs at the sight of a wild creature encumbered 
by a bulky radio transmitter.15 
Although we intuitively sense that fastening spy gear to an 
animal’s neck is incongruous with wildness,16 virtually no scholarship 
has proposed a doctrine of wildlife privacy.  A few authors have 
lamented the lack of wildlife privacy without suggesting any new rules 
to address the problem.17 In fact, to the extent that legal scholars18 and 
animal researchers19 have considered the topic of privacy in the great 
 
cruelly, although their aim is praiseworthy, and they can justify their cruelty, since animals must 
be regarded as man’s instruments.”  Id. 
 15. See Williams, supra note 8, at 113 (describing birds “burdened by radio collars dangling 
around their long, thin necks”). 
 16. National Park Service, Wolf Monitoring 1986-2014. Denali National Park & Preserve, 
https://www.nps.gov/articles/denali-wolf-monitoring.htm (last visited July 7, 2016) (“So, how 
exactly can a collar measure metabolic costs of wolf activities in the wilds of Denali?  The answer 
is surprisingly anything but wild.”). 
 17. See, e.g., WILLIAMS, supra note 8, at 113 (offering no policy proposals, but raising the 
question, “If wildlife is tagged, painted and weighed with transmitters, do the animals become less 
wild?”); Duane, supra note 13 (indicating that “I would miss the unmanipulated wild if it entirely 
disappeared,” but offering no suggestions for new rules) Brandon Keim, Should Animals Have a 
Right to Privacy?,  BACKCHANNEL  Jan. 25, 2016, www.backchannel.com/ should-animals-have-
a-right-to-privacy-ddce06d1a094#j14c0js8s (last accessed on July 7, 2016) (“How might animal 
privacy become a legal right rather than a cultural custom?  Should it?  I don’t know.  These are 
complicated questions.”); Brett Mills, Why We Should Consider the Privacy of Animals, THE 
GUARDIAN, Apr. 30, 2010 (criticizing intrusiveness of wildlife documentaries and “wondering 
whether it’s appropriate to think about” animals’ privacy). 
 18. E.g., Ed Haden & Adam Israel, The Fourth Amendment, Game Wardens, and Hunters, 
46 CUMB. L. REV. 79 (2015–16) (urging that game wardens should be subject to stricter Fourth 
Amendment standards when they search hunters); Katerina Kuh, Environmental Privacy, 2015 
UTAH L. REV. 1 (2015) (arguing that hunters and other humans causing environmental harm 
should not be able to invoke privacy protections in order to prevent government surveillance of 
these activities); Bryan Mull, The Hidden Cost of Rod and Rifle: Why State Fish and Game Laws 
Must Be Amended in Order to Protect Against Unreasonable Search and Seizure in the Great 
Outdoors, 42 U. BALT. L. REV. 801 (2013) (contending that anglers and hunters need stronger 
protection from searches by officials enforcing fish and game laws); Edwin Butterfoss and Joseph 
Day, State v. Colosimo: Minnesota Anglers’ Freedom from Unreasonable Searches and Seizures 
Becomes “The One That Got Away,” 31 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 527 (2004)  (criticizing decision 
by Minnesota Supreme Court that allowed fish and game officers wide latitude to search fishing 
vessels); Donald Douglas, A Comment on Louisiana Wildlife Agents and Probable Cause: Are 
Random Game Checks Constitutional?, 53 LA. L. REV. 525 (1992) (analyzing whether hunters may 
assert constitutional rights when wildlife agents conduct searches without probable cause). 
 19. The ethical guidelines for animal researchers virtually never make reference to the 
privacy of animals.  When a guideline calls for the protection of privacy in field research involving 
animals, chances are that the guideline is referring to the privacy of humans who live near the 
animals.  See, e.g., AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, GUIDELINES FOR ETHICAL CON-
DUCT IN THE CARE AND USE OF NONHUMAN ANIMALS IN RESEARCH, Feb. 24, 2012, www.ap 
a.org/science/leadership/ care/ guidelines.aspx.  The following lang-uage appears under the 
heading “Field Research”: “Research in populated areas must be done with respect for the 
Lininger - For Publication (Do Not Delete) 6/7/2017  1:30 PM 
212 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. XXVII:207 
outdoors, they have generally focused on the privacy of humans, not 
animals.20  The time has come to make wildlife the focus of a discussion 
about privacy in the wilderness. 
This Article suggests that nonhuman species deserve some degree 
of privacy.  Rather than attempt to extend a constitutional privacy right 
to wildlife, this Article conceives of privacy as a penumbra of the 
current statutory scheme protecting the welfare of wild animals.  As 
the Supreme Court famously determined in Griswold v. Connecticut, 
humans derive their privacy rights from a penumbra of other rights 
enumerated in the Constitution.21  If a constitutional penumbra is an 
adequate basis for human privacy, perhaps a statutory penumbra could 
support a limited notion of privacy for wild animals. 
How can a doctrine of wildlife privacy help to regulate the use of 
surveillance collars on animals?  Imputing privacy to animals presents 
the opportunity to import a basic version of the familiar privacy-based 
regulations that govern searches and seizures in the context of criminal 
investigations.  Of course, these rules should not be as strict as their 
counterparts under the Fourth Amendment, but they should cover 
some of the same ground: demanding a particularized showing of need 
for surveillance, requiring insufficiency of less intrusive alternatives, 
limiting the scope and duration of surveillance, mandating review of 
applications by a neutral third party, requiring separate authorization 
and a higher level of urgency for seizures or lethal measures, and 
sanctioning noncompliance with meaningful penalties.22 
A wide-ranging discussion of wildlife privacy and its application to 
all species in all locations would be too expansive to engage in here.  
Instead, this Article will develop its argument by focusing on one 
species, the gray wolf.  No mammal in the United States has evoked 
stronger feelings of loathing—and, more recently in certain circles, 
admiration—than the wolf.23  Wildlife managers have collared 
 
property and privacy or the inhabitants of the area.”  While this sentence does not refer explicitly 
to humans, the context makes clear that humans are the focus: only humans own property. 
 20. Even wildlife advocacy groups seem to associate privacy more with humans than with 
wildlife.  A Google search on June 6, 2016 using the words wildlife, privacy and policy did not 
turn up proposals to protect the privacy of wildlife, but did yield a long list of links to web pages 
in which conservation groups promised not to disclose information about their human donors. 
 21. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 22. See, e.g., id. 
 23. Tom Murphy, EARTHJUSTICE, July 22, 2015, http://earthjustice.org/blog/ (“People either 
love [wolves] or hate them.”). 
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thousands of wolves,24 and while the resulting surveillance has helped 
the wolves’ recovery in some respects, it has also caused serious 
hardships ranging from loss of privacy to death.25 
The topic of surveillance collars on wolves has become particularly 
urgent in light of a recently approved amendment by the U.S. House 
of Representatives that would end all federal funding for wolf 
conservation.26  The purpose of the legislation is to give states most of 
the responsibility for monitoring wolves with collars.27  Some state 
officials have declared that they intend to track down and shoot most 
wolves within their jurisdictions.28  For example, state officials in 
Alaska and Idaho seem to kill wolves whenever the opportunity arises, 
and surveillance collars make this task easier.29  Sometimes the states’ 
hunters collar a “Judas wolf” that leads them back to its pack; the  
 
 
 
 24. For a breakdown showing total collared wolves by jurisdiction, see infra, Part I. 
 25. For a list of potential harms relating to collaring, see infra, Part II. 
 26. Associated Press, Plan for Federal Wolf Delisting Clears House, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2016 
(reporting that delisting would take effect in 2017).  The momentum for such legislation will be 
stronger under the new Trump Administration, according to Amaroq Weiss, a former attorney 
with the Center for Biological Diversity. Amaroq Weiss, Can California’s Wolves Survive 
Trump’s America?, SACRAMENTO BEE, Dec. 22, 2016. 
 27. Hillary Corrigan, Gray Wolf Listing Targeted in Amendment to Funding Bill, BEND 
BULLETIN, July 15, 2016 (noting that House amendment would give states control over wolves). 
 28. Jim Robbins, For Wolves, A Recovery May Not Be the Blessing It Seems, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 6, 2007 (reporting that Idaho governor planned to reduce the state’s wolf population from 
650 to 100, and he said that, “I’m prepared to bid for that first ticket to shoot a wolf myself”); see 
Idaho Lawmakers Approve Spending $400,000 to Kill Wolves, www.localnews8.com, Mar. 8, 2016 
(Idaho killed 78 wolves in 2015, and Idaho’s legislature appropriated $400,000 to kill more in the 
future); Krista Lanlois, Wolf Wars: Alaska’s Republican Governors Find Vicious Ways to Kill 
Predators and Mark Their Territory with the Feds, SLATE, Oct. 31, 2014 (noting that a succession 
of Alaska governors vowed to reduce wolf populations). 
 29. Ken Fischman, A Modest Proposal: One Solution to Idaho’s Wolf Problem, BOISE 
WEEKLY, Jan. 13, 2016 (discussing wolf advocates’ criticism that “radio-collaring wolf pups will 
enable agents to more easily track and find wolves in order to kill” them); Tim Preso, Idaho 
Breaks Agreement Using Holicopter Drops to Collar Wolves in Frank Church Wilderness, 
Earthjustice, Jan. 13, 2016, http://earthjustice.org/news/press/2016/idaho-breaks-agreement-
using-helicopter-drops-to-collar-wolves-in-frank-church-wilderness (“There is every reason to 
believe that these new wolf collars will be used by a state trapper to locate wolves for the purpose 
of killing them.”); Opening Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees, Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Salazar, 
2011 WL 6980674 *28 (9th Cir. Sept. 8, 2011) (indicating that in Idaho, “[s]ome of the wolves 
killed via aerial gunning by state agents are being tracked by radio collars initially implemented 
for the purpose of scientific research.”); cf. Corbin Hiar, NPS Abandons Study After Alaska 
Shoots Research Animals, ENVT. & ENERGY NEWS, Aug. 8, 2016 (“The state of Alaska has 
gunned down so many radio-collared wolves outside the Yukon-Charley Rivers National 
Preserve that the National Park Service has abandoned a 23-year-old study of the predators.”). 
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collared wolf then watches the hunters kill its entire pack but is spared 
so the hunters can slaughter the next pack that it joins.30 
The argument for wildlife privacy will proceed in several analytical 
steps. Part I will discuss the increasing use of telemetry collars to 
monitor wolves.  Part II will analyze how this surveillance harms 
wolves.  Part III will survey the government’s current regulation of wolf 
surveillance.  Part IV will propose a new doctrine of wildlife privacy.  
Part V will explore the policy implications of the privacy-based model, 
and will advocate the importation of certain Fourth Amendment 
principles to the context of wildlife surveillance.  Part VI will consider 
foreseeable objections to this Article’s arguments and proposals. 
I.  INCREASING USE OF SURVEILLANCE COLLARS 
Telemetry collars came into widespread use as part of the 
initiative to reintroduce gray wolves in the United States.  Before the 
arrival of Europeans in North America, gray wolves numbered in the 
hundreds of thousands.31  Settlers spread west and wiped out entire 
wolf populations.32  By the 1930s, the gray wolf had nearly disappeared 
from forty-eight states.33  In the 1980s, the Department of the Interior 
(“DOI”) launched a program to transplant gray wolves from Canada 
into the Northern Rocky Mountain region of the United States.34  
Proponents of this plan sought to mollify critics by classifying the 
relocated wolves as an “experimental, nonessential population” under 
 
 30. Cathy Taibbi, USDA-Collared “Judas Wolves” Used Over and Over to Lead Killers to 
Their Families, TIMBER WOLF INFORMATION NETWORK, Feb. 26, 2016 
http://www.timberwolfinformation.org/usda-collared-judas-wolves-used-over-and-over-to-lead-
killers-to-their-families/ (discussing Idaho officials’ use of Judas wolf); Hiar, supra note 29 
(reporting Alaska’s use of Judas wolves). 
 31. Julie Thrower, Ranching with Wolves: Reducing Conflicts between Livestock and Wolves 
through Integrated Grazing and Wolf Management Plans, 29 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 
319, 319 (2009) (estimating that there were over 200,000 wolves in the grasslands and plains of 
North America before Europeans arrived on this continent). 
 32. Professor Jon Coleman at Notre Dame has chronicled how European settlers and their 
descendants zealously exterminated wolves.  JON COLEMAN, VICIOUS: WOLVES AND MEN IN 
AMERICA (2004). 
 33. W. Ryan Stephens, Gray Wolf Rising: Why the Clash over Wolf Management in the 
Northern Rockies Calls for Congressional Action to Define “Recover” under the Endangered 
Species Act, 36 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV.  917, 919 (2012) (explaining that the wolf 
“had nearly been eradicated throughout the lower forty-eight states by the 1930s,” except for 
small populations in northern Michigan and Minnesota). 
 34. Emily Cowan Brown, The “Wholly Separate” Truth: Did the Yellowstone Wolf Reintro-
duction Violate Section 10(J) of the Endangered Species Act, 27 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV.  425, 
436–41 (2000) (summarizing the steps taken by the Department of the Interior, and the Fish and 
Wildlife Service in particular, to reintroduce the gray wolf in the United States). 
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Section 10(j) of the Endangered Species Act.35  This classification made 
it easier to kill wolves whenever there were conflicts with humans and 
livestock.36  Some observers have lamented the designation because it 
seems paradoxical.  How could gray wolves be both important and 
expendable?37 
DOI directed wildlife managers to devise a strategy for keeping 
track of the reintroduced wolves.38  DOI’s regulations indicated that 
surveillance collars were one possible means of monitoring.39  Wildlife 
managers began using the collars for three purposes.  First, the collars 
provided a wealth of information about the wolves including their 
numbers, range, predation, and habits.40  Second, the collars helped the 
managers keep wolves away from livestock and human communities.41  
Third, the data from the collars allowed the wildlife managers to 
promote certain wolves as celebrities, drawing a large following on the 
internet42 and fueling a multi-million dollar tourist industry in and 
around national parks.43 
 
 
 
 35. Ted Williams, Should Wolves Stay Protected Under the Endangered Species Act?, YALE 
ENVT. 360, July 18, 2013, http://e360.yale.edu/features/should_wolves_stay_protected_under_end 
angered_species_act  (recounting political circumstances at this time and arguing that if the 
Department of the Interior had not been willing to use this special designation for the 
reintroduced wolf population, “wolf recovery was impossible”). 
 36. Id. 
 37. Kieran Suckling, executive director of the Center for Biological Diversity, indicated that 
the status is risky for the gray wolves because “we have maximum discretion to kill them” and 
“we have few to no long-term commitments about the management of these populations.”  
(quoted in IRUS BRAVERMAN, WILD LIFE: THE INSTITUTION OF NATURE 164 (2015)). 
 38. 50 CFR § 17.84 (2015). (“The reintroduced wolves will be monitored during the life of 
the project.”). 
 39. Id. (mentioning “the use of radio telemetry” as a way to monitor the reintroduced 
wolves). 
 40. See Thomas Meier et. al, Tracking the Movement of Denali’s Wolves, NATIONAL PARK 
SERVICE, (last visited Mar. 8, 2017), https://www.nps.gov/articles/aps-v5-i1-c8.htm. 
 41. Doremus, supra note 7, at 60 (discussing how wildlife officials have used surveillance 
collars to minimize conflicts between wolves and humans; if the collars indicate that wolves have 
gone outside of the approved areas, managers tranquilize and move them). 
 42. Associated Press, New Website Maps Celebrity Wolf OR-7’s Travels, OREGON LIVE 
(Jan. 13, 2012), http://www.oregonlive.com/pacific-northwest-news/index.ssf/2012/01/new_websit 
e_maps_celebrity_wol.html (“People interested in the far-flung wanderings of Oregon’s celebr-
ity wolf, OR-7, can keep up with his progress on a new website.”). 
 43. Stephens, supra note 30, at 944 (“wolves add an estimated thirty-five million dollars to 
the Yellowstone region’s economy from the tens of thousands of tourists who come to watch 
them.”). 
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The use of surveillance collars came to pervade virtually the entire 
wolf habitat in the United States.44 A conservative estimate is that 
wildlife managers have attached surveillance collars to thousands of 
wolves.45  Areas with large populations of collared wolves include 
Denali National Park,46 Yellowstone National Park,47 Arizona,48 
Idaho,49 Michigan,50 Minnesota,51 Montana,52 New Mexico,53 North 
 
 44. ROBERT BUSCH, THE WOLF ALMANAC, NEW AND REVISED: A CELEBRATION OF 
WOLVES AND THEIR WORLD 216 (2007) (“In fact, for the past three decades, collar-crazy 
biologists have swarmed over most of the wolf’s north American habitat.”). 
 45. NATIONAL PARK SERVICE, Wolf Information Continued¸ https://www.nps.gov/yell/learn/ 
nature/wolfinfo.htm (explaining that in Yellowstone alone “US Fish and Wildlife Service in 2013 
estimated about 1,592 wolves and 71 breeding pairs in the Northern Rocky Mountain Distinct 
Population Segment including areas of Idaho, Montana, and Wyoming.”). 
 46. NATIONAL PARK SERVICE, WOLF MONITORING 1986-2014 (2014) (“More than 400 
wolves have been captured and collared” in Denali National Park alone.). 
 47. See Gordon Hunt, Meet Doug, the wolf watcher of Yellowstone National Park, (July 8, 
2015), https://www.siliconrepublic.com/discovery/meet-doug-smith-wolf-watcher-yellowstone-
National-park (explaining Doug Smith’s role in “[t]racking the 100 wild wolves incessantly, his 
team collar up to 20 a year, keeping tabs on the animals’ movement, hunting habits, pack traits, 
biology and disease.”). 
 48. Mexican Wolf Interagency Field Team, Monthly Status Report, (May 20, 2016), http://ww 
w.mexicanwolves.org/index.php/news/1648/51/mexican-wolf-reintroduction-%20project-news 
(“At the end of April 2016, the wild Mexican wolf population consisted of 53 wolves with 
functional radio collars,” some of which were in Arizona and some in New Mexico). 
 49. See John O’Connell, Biologist changing way wolves are tracked, CAPITAL PRESS, Dec. 
4, 2015, 11:51 AM), http://www.capitalpress.com/Livestock/20151204/biologist-changing-way-wo 
lves-are-tracked (explaining that “There are currently 88 collared wolves in Idaho.”). 
 50. Keith Creagh, Michigan Wolf Management Program, MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF 
NATURAL RESOURCES (Jun 11, 2015), http://www.michigan.gov/documents/dnr/wolf_manage 
ment_plan_492568_7.pdf. 
 51. Website of International Wolf Center, Track Wild Wolves, INTERNATIONAL WOLF 
CENTER, http://www.wolf.org/programs/educator-resources-wolf-link/track-wild-wolves/ (last 
visited on July 11, 2016) (explaining “[m]ore than 700 wolves have been tracked in northern 
Minnesota. . . .”). 
 52. Montana Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks, Montana Gray Wolf Conservation 
and Management 2015 Annual Report 14 (Mar. 26, 2016), http://fwp.mt.gov/fishandwildlife/mana 
gement/wolf/ (last visited on July 11, 2016) (indicating that in 2015, state officials monitored 
“[f[ifty radio-collared wolves in 32 packs.”). 
 53. Mexican Wolf Interagency Field Team, Monthly Status Report, (May 20, 2016), 
http://www.mexicanwolves.org/index.php/news/1648/51/mexican-wolf-reintroduction-
%20project-news (“At the end of April 2016, the wild Mexican wolf population consisted of 53 
wolves with functional radio collars,” some of which were in Arizona and some in New Mexico). 
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Carolina,54 Oregon,55 Washington,  and Wyoming.56  Some wildlife 
managers aspire to monitor every pack within their territorial 
jurisdiction by collaring at least one wolf per pack.57  In other words, we 
may be approaching a time in which every wolf in the U.S. is under 
direct or indirect surveillance.  The number of wolves wearing collars 
continues to increase in part due to the increasing population of 
wolves58 as well as the declining cost of collars.59 
The technology of the collars has advanced rapidly over the years.  
The earliest versions of the collars emitted VHF signals that managers 
could monitor with receivers as long as they were in range.60  Newer 
collars use GPS technology, which allows for monitoring from a remote 
location.61  In recent years, researchers have devised an array of sensors 
for the collars that measure various metabolic functions62 so as to 
provide a “daily diary” of the wolves’ activities.63  Researchers can use 
 
 54. Bruce Siceloff, Conservations protest as red wolf numbers fall, Charlotte News and 
Observer (Apr. 2, 2016), http://www.newsobserver.com/news/local/article69609417.htm 
(explaining that “there are nearly 40 collared wolves” in North Carolina). 
 55. See Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife, Oregon Wolf Conservation and Manage-
ment 2015 Annual Report 2 (Mar. 18, 2016), dfw.state.or.us/wolves/docs/oregon_wolf_ program/ 
2015-annual-wolf-report-3-18-16-FINAL.pdf (last visited on July 11, 2016) (explaining 
“throughout the year as many as 21 GPS radio-collared wolves were monitored”). 
 56. See Wyoming Game and Fishing Department, Wyoming Gray Wolf Population 
Monitoring and Management Interim Report, (Jan. 1 2014), https://www.fws.gov/mountain-
prairie/es/species/mammals/wolf/annualrpt14/2014_Wyoming_Annual_Report.pdf  (noting that 
“[s]eventy radio-collared wolves . . . were being monitored in Wyoming.”). 
 57. See, e.g., Ann McCreary, Loup Loup pack wolves fitted with radio collars for monitor-
ing, METHOW VALLEY NEWS (July 8, 2016), http://methowvalleynews.com/2016/05/26/lo up-lou 
p-pack-wolves-fitted-with-radio-collars-for-monitoring/ (explaining “[s]tate wildlife officials are 
working to capture and place radio collars on at least wolf in every pack in order to monitor the 
pack’s activities.”). 
 58. Alex Sakariassen, Collaring the Wild, MISSOULA INDEPENDENT, Sept. 11, 2014 (noting 
“the wolf population—and, subsequently, the number of collars in the wild—has increased.”). 
 59. See Merritt Clifton, Field Mortalities in Wildlife Research: It’s Time for a Conversation, 
ANIMALS 24-7 (Aug. 13, 2014), http://www.animals24-7.org/2014/08/13/field-mortalities-in-
wildlife-research-its-time-for-a-conversation/ (explaining “[r]adio-tracking technology has 
improved [in the last few years]—and the price of the needed equipment has plummeted, 
enabling more and more researchers to tag more and more animals.”). 
 60. VHF signals are radio frequencies that can only travel a limited distance. See DAVID 
MECH, A CRITIQUE OF WILDLIFE RADIO-TRACKING AND ITS USE IN NATIONAL PARKS: A 
REPORT TO THE U.S. NATIONAL PARK SERVICE 11-20 (2002), http://npshistory.com/publication 
s/wildlife/radio-tracking-2002.pdf (providing a detailed discussion of VHF radio collars). 
 61. Id. at 23–29 (discussing GPS telemetry and contrasting it with older VHS system). 
 62. Price, supra note 7 (“The SMART (Species Movement, Acceleration, and Radio 
Tracking) collar . . . simultaneously measures the geographic location, behavior, and physiology 
of the animal wearing it.”). 
 63. Johnson, supra note 5 (quoting biology professor Terri Williams at U.C. Santa Cruz, who 
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the collars to monitor when, how and where the wolves eat, socialize, 
mate, and interact with their pups.64 The new collars also have  features 
designed to control wolves in a manner that exemplifies Foucauldian 
biopower.65  Some collars can inject wolves with tranquilizer darts66 
while others are capable of administering painful shocks.67  Wildlife 
managers can use these features to keep wolves from crossing certain 
boundaries in management areas.68  The degree of control exerted by 
modern collars is so great that one conservationist facetiously 
suggested wildlife managers should devise a collar to detect the odor 
of livestock and inject wolves with poison if they come too near this 
forbidden prey.69 
 
 
 
said that, “What you end up with is a diary for the animal, a 24-hour diary that says he spent this 
much time sleeping, and we know from the GPS where that was . . . . Then he woke up and went 
for a walk over here.  He caught something over here.  He ate something and we know what it 
was because the signatures we get for a deer kill vs. a rabbit kill are very different.”); see Bethany 
Augiliere, Beyond GPS: The Next High-Tech Frontier in Wild Animal Tracking, SCIENTIFIC 
AMERICAN, Dec. 30, 2015 (noting that sophisticated collars keep track of all wolves’ activities). 
 64. See Emily Anthes, Tracking the Pack, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 3, 2013), http://www.nytimes.c 
om/2013/02/04/opinion/tracking-the-pack.html (explaining “the use of wildlife tags has pro-
liferated as the devices have become smaller and more powerful . . . Is this particular predator a 
pack leader or a lone wolf? A dedicated hunter or a mooch? How much time does it spend with 
its pups? Who are its associates, rivals and mates?”). 
 65. JACK TURNER, TRAVELS IN THE GREATER YELLOWSTONE 58 (St. Martin’s 2009) 
(“Unfortunately, collaring is also a means of control . . . A collar entails a power relationship.  
There is nothing wilder than wolves and more symbolic of wildness.  To collar a wolf says a lot 
about our attitude toward the wild”); Sara Rinfret, Controlling Animals: Power, Foucault, and 
Species Management, 22 SOCIETY & NAT. RES. 571, 575 (2009) (applying Foucauldian philosophy 
in analyzing government’s use of “tracking devices to monitor and modify the movements” of 
wolves); see Braverman, supra note 34, at 13 (“Although Foucault admittedly uses the term 
‘biopower’ only to describe the project of governing human bodies populations and life, Wild Life 
joins a growing scholarship that extends the scope of biopolitics to the realm of governing 
nonhuman animals.”). 
 66. See MECH, supra note 60(“Researchers locate the animal via telemetry and then signal 
its collar to fire a dart containing drugs into the animal.  The collars are also equipped with a 
back-up dart.  The researchers then follow the signal until the animal is under the effects of the 
injected drugs.”) 
 67. See Jason Hawley et al., Assessment of Shock Collars as Nonlethal Management for 
Wolves in Wisconsin, 73 J. WILDLIFE MGMT. 518, 522–23 (2009) (discussing use of shock collars 
on wolves). 
 68. Doremus, supra note 9, at 60 (reporting use of capture collars to control wolves). 
 69. Fischman, supra note 28 (using in the satirical tone of Jonathan Swift, proposing that 
wolf collars “be furnished with remote scent detectors and strychnine self-injection devices, which 
could be adjusted in such a manner that if wolves were to approach domestic livestock within a 
certain distance (let us say 50 feet), the strychnine injector could be automatically triggered to 
deliver a lethal dose to the wolf that would kill it within seconds.”). 
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The use of surveillance collars enjoys strong support in certain 
circles of wildlife managers and biologists.70  To be sure, most of these 
people have a sincere interest in helping wolves,71 and they believe that 
surveillance collars will enhance the wolves’ odds of survival.72  But 
there are many factors that lead to an excessive emphasis on collars.  
These devices allow humans to “turn nature’s dials” to an 
unprecedented extent,73 and it is hard to resist the temptation to use 
such powerful technology.74  Professor Etienne Benson wrote that 
researchers became enamored with radio telemetry: “Wedding 
Americans’ fascination with the wild to their equally fervent 
enthusiasm for technology, the rise of radio tracking as the privileged 
mode of knowing wild animals seemed both ironic and inevitable.”75  
The radio collar came to epitomize man’s dominion over nature — a 
gratifying notion for the few who could utilize this equipment.76  The 
technophiles also found that their use of surveillance collars generated 
ample data that they could present in scholarly journals,77 thereby 
 
 70. Busch, supra note 44 (referring to “collar-crazy biologists” who gather information about 
wolves); see Zoe Jewell, Effect of Monitoring Technique on Quality of Conservation Science, 27 
CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 501, 501 (2013) (explaining “[i]n the last few decades, there has been 
an enthusiastic adoption of invasive techniques for gathering ecological and conservation data.”); 
id at 505 (decrying the “slavish addiction to GPS telemetry.”). 
 71. Duane, supra note 13 (while disturbing in some respects, the increasing use of technology 
in the wilderness is well intentioned; “hardworking biologists—thank heaven—use the best tools 
available to protect whatever wild creatures remain.”); accord Yellowstone Park Foundation, 
supra note 37 (discussing the value of data that wildlife biologists have obtained through their use 
of collars on wolves). 
 72. Paul Henson & Kurt Melcher, Why Wolves Should Continue to Wear Radio Collars, 
THE OREGONIAN (Dec. 22, 2014), http://www.oregonlive.com/opinion/index.ssf/2014/12/why_w 
olves_should_continue_to.html (explaining , for example, Paul Henson, Oregon state supervisor 
for the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, and Kurt Melcher, interim director for the Oregon 
Department of Fish and Wildlife, made an earnest case to continue the practice of collaring 
wolves despite criticism of the infringement on wolves’ wildness and privacy). 
 73. See generally Duane, supra note 13 (explaining that the high-tech “infrastructure is 
proliferating and improving so quickly, thanks to advances in digital technology, that wildlife 
managers are seizing more and more of nature’s relevant dials—predator and prey alike—and 
turning those dials to keep nature looking the way we want it to.”). 
 74. ETIENNE BENSON, WIRED WILDERNESS: TECHNOLOGIES OF TRACKING AND THE 
MAKING OF MODERN WILDLIFE 2 (2010) (noting that of the various techniques used by 
biologists to monitor wildlife, none has “inspired so many encomiums to the potential for 
technology to ‘save nature’ as wildlife radio tracking or radiotelemetry.”). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. (referencing a historian who views radio collar as ‘the perfect symbol of our efforst to 
come to terms with out knowledge of nature’s order, our power over it.”). 
 77. See generally BUSCH, supra note 44, at 216 (observing that “the use of radio collars, 
widely used since 1960s, has now made the wolf a favorite research target.”). 
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enhancing their professional stature. A large-scale collaring operation 
could bring in significant grant money as well.78  For these reasons, the 
proponents of surveillance collars continue to rely heavily on this 
technique, even as critics have raised concerns about potentially 
detrimental consequences.79 
II.  HARMS CAUSED BY COLLARS 
This Part will survey a wide range of possible harms that could 
result from the use of telemetry collars on wolves.  The purpose of this 
Part is not to argue that the harms of surveillance always outweigh the 
benefits; on the contrary, there may very well be instances in which the 
instrumental value of data derived from the collars80 justifies any 
hardship that the surveillance entails.81  Rather, the point of itemizing 
 
 78. TURNER, supra note 65, at 58 (mentioning that the collaring of wolves can be “a well 
funded, open-ended science project for federal, state and academic biologists, and a fresh 
marketing ploy for conservation foundations.”). 
 79. See Andrews, supra note 10 (“While researchers are aware of the limitations and dangers 
of telemetry, other factors—such as a seemingly insatiable appetite for new and improved 
gadgetry—often take precedence.”); Busch, supra note 44 (“In the rush to gather data [about 
wolves], the human aspects of biology are sometimes left behind.”). 
 80. Some critics have disputed the value of the data obtained through continued use of 
surveillance collars.  Professor Terry Tempest Williams, the Tanner Scholar in Environmental 
Humanities at the University of Utah, has expressed doubts that further telemetry can add 
substantially to our understanding of the collared animals’ biology, at least by comparison to other 
less intrusive surveillance techniques.  “I think about the ethics of wild animals being tagged and 
collared, the grizzlies and wolves of Yellowstone . . . Tens of thousands of animals in the United 
States are numbered and scanned, then monitored through biological surveillance.  What are we 
learning that we didn’t know?  That we couldn’t learn simply by observation?”  TERRY TEMPEST 
WILLIAMS, FINDING BEAUTY IN A BROKEN WORLD 113 (2009).  Professor Etienne Benson, while 
noting certain benefits of radiotracking wildlife, also pointed out some of the limitations: 
“Radiotracking produced large amounts of movement data that could be easily quantified, but 
that did not necessarily have any connection to the environment in which the movements took 
place.”  Etienne Benson, Minimal Animal: Surveillance, Simulation and Stochasticity in Wildlife 
Biology, 30 ANTENNAE 39, 49 (2014); see Susan Rehm-Westoff, All About Those Collars, 
LEGENDS OF LAMAR VALLEY, www.legendoflamarvalley.com/ all-about-those-collars/ 
(last visited on July 12, 2016) (noting the criticism that “we have learned enough about wild 
wolves and they should now be left to live in peace without the weight of a collar around their 
neck”); Larry Thorngren, Yellowstone Researcher Has Collared 759 Wolves, Nov. 1, 2010, 
www.thewildphotographer.com/ 2010/11/yellowstone-wolf-researcher-has.html (criticizing 
the continued use of wolf collars at Yellowstone National Park because “[a]ny useful information 
was retrieved years ago and the study is now is more about locating wolves for tourists to watch 
than for any biological reason” and alleging that”[n]ot one wolf has been helped by the study and 
759 Yellowstone wolves have been treated like lab rats.”). 
 81. It is undeniable that past surveillance of wolves has advanced our understanding of the 
species and has aided recovery in certain contexts.  For example, Doug Smith, leader of the 
Yellowstone Wolf Project and one of the foremost experts on wolf biology, derived a great deal 
of his insight into the species by collaring and monitoring hundreds of Yellowstone wolves.  See 
Lininger - For Publication (Do Not Delete) 6/7/2017  1:30 PM 
Spring 2017] UNLOCKING THE “VIRTUAL CAGE” 221 
all the possible deleterious effects is to allow a careful marginal analysis 
that takes account of harms and benefits for every increment of 
surveillance.82 
The following Subparts will discuss several categories of problems 
caused by surveillance collars.  The collars can harm wolves by 
inflicting physical injury, reducing privacy, or some combination of the 
two.83  In addition to the harms that befall wolves, the collaring and 
segregation of wolves can disrupt entire ecosystems.  The mistreatment 
of wolves can even harm humans, as it fosters a prejudice that has led 
to victimization of humans who seem to share certain wolf-like 
characteristics. 
A.  Harms to Collared Wolves 
One of the biggest hazards associated with collaring is the high 
rate of injury that occurs at the time of capture. Trapping sometimes 
results in broken bones, lacerations, or even death.84  The alternative 
 
Yellowstone Park Foundation, Collars Are Key to Wolf Studies, Oct. 19, 2010, 
http://www.ypf.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=5473 (listing various benefits of 
monitoring wolves with collars); cf., Duane, supra note 13 (“There had not been a wolf sighting 
in California since 1924, so OR-7’s walkabout—and the fact that he wore a collar— was 
responsible for the listing of gray wolves as a California endangered species.”).  The question 
remains, however, whether each future increment of surveillance is justifiable in a marginal cost-
benefit analysis.  The fact that past surveillance led to useful discoveries does not necessarily 
warrant indefinite continuation of surveillance—especially because surveillance of animals by 
biologists (unlike, say, observation of a particular criminal suspect by police) generally can 
provide cumulate benefits that apply outside the context of the particular investigation. 
 82. According to Paul Joslin, director of research at Wolf Haven International, “current 
technologies for catching them are so traumatic that wolves should not be caught unless there is 
a reasonable expectation that the results will have some potential positive benefit for the animals 
involved.”  Paul Joslin, quoted in Busch, supra note 44, at 216 (describing harm to wolves trapped 
for collaring).  One academic has noted the irony that increasing human knowledge of wolves has 
not necessarily redounded to the benefit of the wolves.  COLEMAN, supra note 32, at 81 (“Whereas 
luck once brought humans and wolves together, now pricey gadgets allow people to spy on the 
elusive beasts.  Humans know more about wolves today than at any time in the two species’ eons-
long association on this planet.  Ironically, this knowledge has accumulated at a low point in this 
relationship.  Human beings learned about wolves at the same time as they pushed the animals to 
the edge of extinction.  Enlightenment and annihilation occurred in tandem.”). 
 83. Brandon Keim, Should Animals Have a Right to Privacy?, BACKCHANNEL (Jan. 25, 
2016), www.backchannel.com/should-animals-have-a-right-to-privacy-ddce06d1a094#j14c0js8s 
(arguing that, for collared animals, “privacy is intertwined with physical protection.”). 
 84. “Unfortunately, many of the wolves caught for radio-collaring are injured during the 
trapping process.  In one study of 109 wolves live-captured in Minnesota and Alaska from 1969 
to 1976, 41 percent had skin lacerations, dislocations, or broken bones because of trap injuries.  
Almost half (46 percent) had tooth, lip, or gum injuries caused by the wolves’ attempts to chew 
off the trap.”  Busch, supra note 44, at 216.  Zoe Jewell, an adjunct associate professor at Duke’s 
Nicholas School of the Environment, has noted that “invasive techniques, relying on capture and 
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of shooting wolves with tranquilizer darts can also cause injuries 
because the wounds from the darts can become infected, and the 
sedatives used in the darts are occasionally toxic.85  Ed Bangs, a Forest 
Service employee who collared a large number of wolves when he 
supervised the reintroduction in the Northern Rocky Mountain region, 
estimated that two percent of the captured wolves died.86  Even those 
that survive without physical injury experience lasting psychological 
effects, as the trauma of capture leads to a phenomenon akin to 
posttraumatic stress disorder in humans.87  Sometimes captured wolves 
are absent from their packs for a prolonged period,88 which can disrupt 
their socialization.89 
 
immobilization for marking or tagging, can negatively impact species in a variety of ways.”  Zoe 
Jewell, quoted in Using—and Sharing—New Technologies is Key for Conservation, DUKE TODAY 
(Oct. 5, 2015), www.today.duke.edu. 
 85. Don Jenkins, Capture Leads to Fatal Infection for Washington Wolf, CAPITAL PRESS 
(May 10, 2016), http://www.capitalpress.com/Washington/20160510/capture-leads-to-fatal-infecti 
on-for-washington-wolf (“The breeding female of southeastern Washington’s only wolfpack was 
found dead of an infection five days after being captured and fitted with a transmitting collar . . . 
The wolf, a member of the Tuconnan pack, likely picked up the infection from a wound she 
received while being shot with a dart to immobilize her”); 2 Gray Wolves Die During Annual 
Government Count, SANTA FE NEW MEXICAN (Feb. 3, 2016), http://www.santafenewmexican.co 
m/news/briefs/mexican-gray-wolves-die-during-annual-government-count/article_9684f143-e5fe-
517b-889d-04245dc145a9.html (reporting two deaths in an operation to capture and collar 
Mexican gray wolves; one wolf died “within minutes of being darted,” and the other died four 
days after release). 
 86. Margaret Guthrie, Wolf Whistle, SCIENTIST MAGAZINE (Dec. 1, 2009), www.the-
scientist.com/?articles.view/articleNo/27813/title/Wolf-whistle/  (“Ed Bangs, of the U.S. Fish & 
Wildlife service, who’s in charge of the interagency cooperation on managing the wolf population, 
estimates that approximately 2 percent of the wolves trapped for radio collaring die from the 
trauma.”); see Rehm-Westoff, supra note 80 (raising concerns about researchers’ reliance on 
telemetry collars because “several wolves died during the collaring process.”). 
 87. Joslin, supra note 82, at 216 (“some preliminary data to suggest that wolves not only 
remember what happens to them [during their capture for collaring], but are capable of suffering 
from post-traumatic stress.”); Rehm-Westoff, supra note 80 (noting critics’ “concern for the 
trauma, both emotionally and physically, that the collaring procedures inflict on the wolves.”); 
Jay Mallonee & Paul Joslin, Traumatic Stress Disorder Observed in an Adult Wild Captive Wolf 
(Canis Lupus), 7 J. APPLIED ANIMAL WELFARE SCIENCE 107 (2010) (observing that darting and 
capture resulted in “symptoms that were similar to those of humans with posttraumatic stress 
disorder.”); see generally Jewell, supra note 70, at 501 (describing “wide-ranging psychological 
effects of acute and chronic stress” that animals suffer during capture; observing that the 
“emergency literature on the immediate and longer-term effects of capture and handling 
procedure indicate that it can no longer be assumed that a wild animal’s survival of the process 
implies the safety of the procedure.”). 
 88. Wyoming v. Livingston, 443 F.3d 1211, 1214 (10th Cir. 2006) (discussing the process of 
capture and collaring, which can sometimes take a long time because wildlife officials move the 
captured wolves to a central location before returning them to their packs). 
 89. See Jewell, supra note 70, at 505 (“Even apparently minor interference in the life of a 
free-ranging animal can have serious negative effects . . . . [T]emporary removal of individuals 
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The collars themselves can cause significant and ongoing harm to 
wolves.  The size of wolves’ necks may change as they age or their diet 
varies.  Collars that become too restrictive to cause edema or wounds.90  
Even if the collars continue to fit, they can still harm the wolves by 
providing a hiding place for ticks91 and a warm home for mange mites.92 
The radio signals emitted by surveillance collars might also pose health 
risks to wolves over time, although there is disagreement among 
scientists concerning the extent of this hazard.93  Certain types of collars 
are quite bulky relative to a wolf’s body weight, and this encumbrance 
causes discomfort that can disrupt the wolf’s behavior.94 It is no wonder  
 
 
 
from a population can cause social disruption and lead to permanent hierarchical changes, 
particularly in social animals such as wolves.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 90. Zoe Jewell, a researcher affiliated with Duke University, made the following comment 
on ResearchGate, an online community of researchers: “A collar that is comfortable on fitting 
can quickly change fit with the condition of the animal and become too tight causing peripheral 
oedema and/or wounding.”  What is the Optimal Way of Putting a Collar Around an Animal’s 
Neck?, RESEARCHGATE.NET (May 19, 2015), https://www.researchgate.net/post/What_is_the_op 
timal_way_of_putting_a_collar_around_an_animals_neck. 
 91. The ethical guidelines for radio tracking in Australia note that, “[i]n areas where ticks 
occur, care should be taken in using collars as they may prevent the animal from grooming 
normally and removing the tick.”  Radio Tracking Wildlife Research, ANIMAL ETHICS INFOLINK, 
www.animalethics.org.au/policies-and-guideliens/widlife-research/radio-tracking (last visited 
July 11, 2016) (indicating that “alternatives to collars should be used” in these areas).  Cf. 
Andrews, supra note 10 (indicating that surveillance collars inhibit howler monkeys’ grooming 
and removal of small pests from their fur). 
 92. Nowhere to Hide. . .The Intrusive Collaring of Wolves, HOWLING FOR JUSTICE: 
BLOGGING FOR THE GRAY WOLF (Nov. 14, 2010),  https://howlingforjustice.wordpress.com/tag/s 
arcoptic-mange/ (“Another adverse effect of collaring [wolves] is the dreaded mange mite.  It 
finds a warm home under their collars, which can torment wolves who are infested with the pest, 
causing itching and distress, leading to further deterioration of their condition.”); Paul Cross, 
Effects of Sarcoptic Mange on Gray Wolves in Yellowstone Park, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, 
www.usgs.gov/centers/norock/science/effects-sarcoptic-mange-gray-wolves-yellowstone-national 
-park (last visited on July 12, 2016) (“Sarcoptic mange is a highly contagious canine skin 
disease . . . which eventually lead to death.”); see also Paul Cross et al., Energetic Costs of Mange 
in Wolves Estimated from Infrared Thermography, 97 ECOLOGY 1938 (2016) (explaining how 
mange infection causes heat loss, reduce movement, and change predation by wolves because 
they are losing energy so rapidly). 
 93. See Microwaves, Radio Waves, and Other Types of Radiofrequency Radiation, 
AMERICAN CANCER SOCIETY (May 31, 2016), www.cancer.org/cancer/cancercauses/ 
radiationexposureandcancer/radiofrequency-radiation (noting that International Agency for 
Research on Cancer has identified RF exposure as a possible carcinogen, but observing that the 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and the U.S. National Toxicology Program have not yet 
formally classified RF radiation as to its cancer-causing potential). 
 94. According to Jewell, “Even mild discomfort [attributable to a surveillance collar] can 
distort behavior.”  Jewell, supra note 90. 
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that wolves try to chew off their collars and free themselves of this 
menace.95 
A different set of harms arises when wildlife managers use 
surveillance collars to confine wolves within a particular area.  
Genetically programmed to roam great distances as they pursue prey 
or escape predation, wolves are nomadic by nature.96  Their territory 
can extend for hundreds of miles.97  Surveillance collars provide a 
means of controlling wolves’ movements98 and substantially reducing 
their territory.99 Managers who monitor the collars’ transmissions can 
track down and recapture wolves that have strayed too far.  Some 
collars even administer shocks100 or tranquilizers101 to prevent wolves 
from leaving their approved areas.102  New York Times columnist John 
 
 95. Wolves near Idaho City Learn to Chew off Radio Collars, WOLF SAGA (July 27, 2006), 
http://wolfsaga.blogspot.com/2006/07/wolves-near-idaho-city-learn-to-chew.html. (reporting that 
wolves have “found a way to chew off their radio collars.”); see Andrews, supra note 10 (reporting 
that howler monkeys also tried to extricate themselves from their surveillance collars). 
 96. According to David Mech, a senior research scientist employed by the U.S. Geological 
Survey, “wolves are nomadic for about half the year, after their pups have grown and developed 
enough to move with them . . . Wolves are capable and inveterate travelers . . . Packs can travel 
up to 56 km (35 miles) at night and 76 km (45 miles) by day.”  DAVID MECH ET AL., WOLVES: 
BEHAVIOR, ECOLOGY AND CONSERVATION 32 (2010). 
 97. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 34, at 432 (observing that wolves’ territory can extend up to 
a thousand miles); Linda Maples, New Wolf Pack in Washington, SEATTLE TIMES (Nov. 25, 2015), 
http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/environment/wolf-pack/ (“Wolves are also legendary 
travelers . . . . A year-and-a-half-old female traveled more than 3,00 miles in just six months.”); 
Press Release, U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, Canid North of Grand Canyon Confirmed to be a 
Rocky Mountain Gray Wolf (Nov. 10, 2014), https://www.fws.gov/news/shownews.cfm?ref=can 
id-north-of-grand-canyon-confirmed-to-be-a-rocky-mountain-gray-wolf&_ID=34770 (“The 
DNA results indicate this wolf traveled at least 450 miles from an area in the northern Rocky 
Mountains to northern Arizona.”). 
 98. TURNER, supra note 65, at 57 (“Unfortunately, collaring is also a means of control—a 
cop collars a criminal; a farmer uses a collar to manage draft animals.”); Rinfret, supra note 65 
(applying Foucauldian philosophy in analyzing government’s use of “tracking devices to monitor 
and modify the movements” of wolves); see BRAVERMAN, supra note 37, at 13 (discussing “a 
growing scholarship that extends the scope of biopolitics to the realm of governing nonhuman 
animals.”). 
 99. See Jewell, supra note 70, at 505 (citing research indicating that animals with surveillance 
collars have smaller ranges than animals with collars). 
 100. Andrews, supra note 10 (discussing use of shock collars on wild wolves: “When the 
wolves tried to roam beyond a fence of senses controlled by satellite, they were shocked.”). 
 101. Doremus, supra note 9 (reporting that government fitted wolves “with ‘capture collars’ 
designed to deliver a sedative dose in response to a radio signal”). See INTERNATIONAL WOLF 
CENTER, supra note 7 (“These special radio collars can also be equipped with darts holding a 
tranquilizer, which can be triggered from a distance.  This allows researchers to easily recapture 
an animal.”). 
 102. Doremus, supra note 9, at 60. 
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Mooellem refers to such a device as a “kill switch”103 because it 
essentially shuts down the wolf, much like cutting the power to a 
machine.  Mark Phillips, a wildlife biologist who formerly worked with 
collared wolves, expressed his dismay that he was essentially a 
“zookeeper” in the wilderness.104 Professor Holly Doremus has gone 
so far as to say that such restrictions on movement deprive wolves of 
their wildness.105  Limitations on movement not only suppress wolves’ 
true nature but also impair their physical health by limiting their access 
to prey and their ability to adapt to stressors by relocating to more 
hospitable environments.106 
Surveillance collars also increase wolves’ vulnerability to hunting.  
Certain types of collars have bright colors, making the collared animals 
more easily visible to hunters.107  Critics have suggested that hunters 
can track the signals from telemetry collars, either because the hunters 
can intercept the signals surreptitiously,108 or because the hunters gain 
 
 103. JON MOOALLEM, WILD ONES: A SOMETIMES DISMAYING, WEIRDLY REASSURING 
STORY ABOUT LOOKING AT PEOPLE LOOKING AT ANIMALS IN AMERICA 262 (2013) (“When red 
wolves were reintroduced in North Carolina, the animals were outfitted with special collars that 
could be triggered remotely to stick the wolves in the neck with a sedative.  It was a kind of a kill 
switch, in case the humans who were monitoring the wolves saw an animal’s signal wander outside 
the designated territory but couldn’t get on the ground quickly enough to intercept it.”); 
BRAVERMAN, supra note 37, at 164 (when collared wolves move outside an “arbitrary zone,” 
humans will “go and kill them, or capture them and put them back”). 
 104. Loder, supra note 1, at 127 (quoting Mike Phillips, a wildlife biologist whose duties 
involved collaring and moving wolves as part of the reintroduction initiative: “What are we 
doing? . . .  I’m starting to feel like a damned zookeeper.”). 
 105. Doremus, supra note 9, at 61 (“These direct control measures erect a virtual cage around 
the animals, converting them from wild creatures into semi-domesticated ones . . . .”); see 
Doremus, supra note 3 (arguing that by confining animals in finite spaces, we are “giving up the 
wildness of nature and the ability of species to pursue their own evolutionary destiny”). 
 106. Jewell has written that, “for free-ranging animals that need to predate and avoid 
predation, any negative impact on movement could cause very significant reduction in fitness.” 
Zoe Jewell, What is the Optimal Way of Putting a Collar Around an Animal’s Neck?, RESEARCH 
GATE (May 25, 2015),  www.researchgate.net/post/What_is_the_optimal_way_of_putting_a_coll 
ar_around_an_animals_neck. 
 107. See Tariku Gutema, Wildlife Radio Telemetry: Use, Effect and Ethical Consideration with 
Emphasis on Birds and Mammals, 24 INT’L J. SCIENCES: BASIC & APPLIED RESEARCH 306, 309 
(2015) (observing that the mortality rate was higher for collared white-tailed deer than for their 
uncollared counterparts; one possible explanation was that the collars “allowed hunters to more 
easily see the deer”). 
 108. Declaration of James Peek, professional biologist and former professor of wildlife 
management at University of Idaho, submitted to U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho, 
Wolf Recovery Foundation vs. U.S. Forest Service, Jan. 22, 2010, available on WestLaw at 2010 
WL 2150437 (“It is not hard for outfitters or other members of the public to get the signal 
information from radio collars and therefore the locations of the wolves.  This information would 
make it much easier to locate the wolves and kill them . . . .”); see also Jeff Hull, Out of Bounds: 
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access to signals when the government shares the frequencies with 
ranchers.109  According to some reports, poachers who are able to 
monitor the government’s telemetry have killed collared animals 
within hours after the initial collaring.110 Sometimes government 
officials are the ones who shoot the collared animals.111  The agencies 
that spend millions to collar and protect wolves might abruptly decide 
to slaughter them,112 and surveillance collars facilitate the efficient 
 
The Death of 832F, Yellowstone’s Most Famous Wolf, OUTDOOR MAGAZINE, Feb. 13, 2013 
(pointing out that after the shooting deaths of collared wolves at Yellowstone, commenters on a 
hunting website claimed responsibility and “admitted that they would go after collared wolves”); 
Jeffrey St. Clair, Sacrificial Wolves of Yellowstone, THE ECOLOGIST, Oct. 29, 2013 (“There is 
compelling evidence that anti-wolf hunters in Wyoming had been honing in on the telemetry 
frequencies from the radio collars to track and kill the wolves . . . .”). 
 109. See, e.g., Wyoming v. Livingston, 443 F.3d 1211, 1214 (10th Cir. 2006) (“The USFWS also 
provides the radio frequencies [for wolf collars] to local ranchers to alert them when wolf packs 
are near.”); Matthew Weaver, Lawmakers Question Wolf Collar Data Blackout for Ranchers, 
CAPITAL PRESS, May 6, 2016 (indicating that Washington wildlife officials share wolf tracking 
data with ranchers except during denning season); Chris Roberts, New Mexico Ranchers’ Use of 
Technology to Track Wolves Debated, EL PASO TIMES, Aug. 16, 2010 (revealing that U.S. Fish 
and Wildlife officials have shared telemetry equipment and tracking frequencies with ranchers in 
Arizona and New Mexico). But see George Plaven, Ranchers Want More Precise Wolf Locations 
from GPS Collars, CAPITAL PRESS, Oct.. 13, 2014 (reporting frustration of Oregon ranchers when 
the state’s fish and game officials only provided general information, not exact location of wolves). 
 110. Merritt Clifton, Field Mortalities in Wildlife Research: It’s Time for a Conversation, Aug. 
13, 2014, www.animals24-7.org/field_mortalities_in_wildlife_ research#-V38E2DfW_AE (last 
visited on July 7, 2016) (pointing to over 50 cases in which poachers have apparently intercepted 
transmissions from radio-tagged animals, “often within days and sometimes within hours of the 
radio tracking devices being attached to the animals.”). 
 111. Fischman, supra note 29 (discussing criticism that “radio-collaring wolf pups will enable 
agents to more easily track and find wolves in order to kill enough of them to drive down Idaho’s 
wolf population”); Jody Emel, Are You Man Enough, Big and Bad Enough? Ecofeminism and 
Wolf Eradication in the USA., reprinted in ANIMAL GEOGRAPHIES: PLACE, POLITICS AND 
IDENTITY IN THE NATURE-CULTURE BORDERLANDS 102 n. 47 (1988) (“Wolves are tranquilized 
and collared with radio collars, then tracked by planes and shot down.”); e.g., Montana 
Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks, Montana Gray Wolf Conservation and Management 
2015 Annual Report 14 (Mar. 26, 2016), http://fwp.mt.gov/fishandwildlife/management/wolf/ (last 
visited on July 11, 2016) (noting that the population of collared wolves declined due in part to 
state officials’ “control”); ODFW Kills Four NE Oregon Wolves after Five Livestock Attacks, 
KTVZ.COM (Mar. 31 2016) http://www.ktvz.com/news/odfw-kills-four-ne-oregon-wolves-after-
five-livestock-attacks/69132996 (indicating that Oregon officials killed four wolves, two with 
collars). See USDA Animal and Plant Health and Inspection Service, PROGRAM DATA REPORT 
G-2015, https://www.aphis.usda.gov/wildlife_damage/pdr/PDR-G_Report.php?fy=2015&fld=&fl 
d_val= (last visited on July 17, 2016) (stating that in 2015, federal officials killed 383 gray wolves). 
 112. Christopher Ketcham, Wolves to the Slaughter, AMERICAN PROSPECT, Mar. 13, 2016 
(“After spending upward of $40 million studying the animals—then capturing, collaring, tracking, 
and protecting them—the federal government last year scheduled wolves to be killed in huge 
numbers . . . .”); Opening Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees, Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Salazar, 
available on Westlaw at 2011 WL 6980674 *28 (9th Cir. Sept. 8, 2011) (indicating that in Idaho, 
“[s]ome of the wolves killed via aerial gunning by state agents are being tracked by radio collars 
Lininger - For Publication (Do Not Delete) 6/7/2017  1:30 PM 
Spring 2017] UNLOCKING THE “VIRTUAL CAGE” 227 
extermination of the animals.113  Certain states such as Alaska and 
Idaho have shown a particular zeal for killing wolves, including 
collared wolves.114  The recent congressional amendment delisting the 
gray wolf portends ominously for their future in these states.115 
The use of surveillance collars on wolves is objectionable even 
when this invasion of privacy does not result in physical harm to the 
animals.116 The intrusion violates their autonomy and wildness.117  
Numerous studies have shown that animals cherish their ability to hide 
and conduct certain intimate affairs in private.118  While some 
categories of professionals, such as documentary filmmakers, have 
begun to value wild animals’ privacy for its own sake,119 wildlife 
 
initially implemented for the purpose of scientific research”). 
 113. GRETTA NILLSON, ENDANGERED SPECIES HANDBOOK: VANISHING SPECIES 4  (2005) 
(“Some hunters use the signals emitted by radio transmitters placed in wild animal collars by 
biologists for tracking, to hone in and better pursue them to their deaths. . . These devices give 
humans such an advantage that they render the natural protections animals have evolved over 
eons completely ineffective”). E.g., KTVZ.com, supra note 116 (surveillance collars allowed 
state’s hunters to kill wolves within hours after receiving authorization). 
 114. Roger Phillips, Idaho: radio collars are vital tool for game management, IDAHO DEPT. 
FISH & GAME, Jan. 25, 2016 (discussing Idaho’s “use of radio collars to ensure targeted removal” 
of wolves); Sean Cockerham, Collared Wolves Killed During Aerial Predator Control, ALASKA 
NEWS, (Mar. 18, 2010) (“the Alaska Department of Fish and Game resumed killing wolves from 
helicopters this week in the Interior and immediately sparked controversy by wiping out a pack 
that included wolves collared for research . . . .”). See supra note 26–27 and accompanying text 
(noting legislation to give states control over wolves). 
 115. Delisting would allow states to control management (including collaring) of most wolves 
in the United States.  See supra note 26–27 and accompanying text. 
 116. As noted previously, surveillance collars can result in concomitant privacy violations and 
physical injuries.  Keim, supra note 17. 
 117. See Doremus, supra note 3 (arguing that by collaring animals and limiting their ability to 
engage in instinctive behaviors, we are “giving up the wildness of nature and the ability of species 
to pursue their own evolutionary destiny”). 
 118. See, e.g., Henry F. Fradella, et al., Quantifying Katz: Empirically Measuring “Reasonable 
Expectations of Privacy” in the Fourth Amendment Context, 38 AM. J. CRIM L. 289, 301 (2011) 
(“Although privacy is a concept that is often perceived as being a unique characteristic of human 
beings, several decades of growing evidence suggest human and animals both share biological 
needs for privacy.”). See JUDITH DECEW, IN PURSUIT OF PRIVACY: LAW, ETHICS AND THE RISE 
OF TECHNOLOGY 12 (Cornell University Press 1997) (“[V]irtually all animals seek periods of 
individual seclusion or small group intimacy,” and this inclination to be private serves “various 
biological purposes, especially that of ensuring propagation of the species”); Peter Klopfer and 
Daniel Rubenstein, The Concept of Privacy and Its Biological Bases, 33 J. SOCIAL ISSUES 52, 64 
(1977) (“In sum, there are innumerable instances of nonhuman animals acting in a manner that 
characterizes humans seeking privacy”). 
 119. Professor Brett Mills at the University of East Anglia has argued that filmmakers 
shooting wildlife documentaries should respect the privacy of their nonhuman subjects.  
“[P]rivacy as it is commonly understood it [sic] is a culturally human concept,” Mills 
acknowledged. Brett Mills, Television Wildlife Documentaries and Animals’ Right to Privacy, 24 
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biologists and  managers have been surprisingly slow to acknowledge 
the intrinsic importance of privacy in the wild.120  The use of 
surveillance collars denies wolves any privacy altogether; an animal 
wearing a surveillance collar is “never able to hide.”121 These collars 
allow ubiquitous, incessant surveillance as if the wolves were inmates 
in Bentham’s Panopticon.122  Some wildlife biologists appear more 
interested in sustaining the lives of the animals they monitor (or at least 
a minimal number within a species) than in preserving the behavioral 
characteristics that are the essence of that species.123  The obsession 
with preserving life is understandable given the vulnerability of many 
species to extinction, but the gray wolf is not such a species,124 so the 
preservation of its wildness merits higher priority.   
Some might argue that surveillance does not jeopardize wildness 
because animals do not understand that they are under surveillance.125 
 
CONTINUUM: J. OF MEDIA & CULTURAL STUD. 193, 196 (2010). “We can never really know if 
animals are giving consent but they often do engage in forms of behaviour which suggest they’d 
rather not encounter humans, and we might want to think about equating this with a desire for 
privacy.” Alessandro Torello, Do Animals Deserve Privacy, Too?, April 30, 2010, WALL ST. J., 
https://blogs.wsj.com/brussels/2010/04/30/do-animals-deserve-privacy-too/ (quoting Mills). 
 120. To the contrary, the people who conduct surveillance of wildlife have shown an alarming 
willingness to invade animals’ privacy and even showcase the animals on social media.  See supra 
note 66.  There is nothing private about the life of an animal with a Facebook page that chronicles 
all of that animal’s activities.  “Knowing a wolf’s number and collar frequency are gateways to 
knowing an astonishing amount of information about it, rather like knowing a person’s Social 
Security number and computer passwords. A wolf without a number and collar is anonymous: no 
control, no knowledge.”  TURNER, supra note 65, at 58; Emily Anthes, Tracking the Pack, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 3, 2013 (observing that by using high-tech devices “to track free-ranging animals, 
biologists are providing us with intimate access to the daily lives of other species”). 
 121. Animals in the modern “wired wilderness” are “never able to hide, never out of 
surveillance.”  Jacob Hamlin, Introduction, 3 H-ENV’T ROUNDTABLE REV. 2, (2013) (describing 
modern surveillance of wilderness as “Orwellian” and comparing high-tech control of nature to 
the scenario depicted in the movie The Hunger Games, with “‘wild’ inhabitants completely 
manufactured at will by the game managers”). 
 122. Michael Lewis, Comments on Wired Wilderness: Technologies of Tracking and the 
Making of Modern Wildlife, 3 H-ENV’T ROUNDTABLE REV. 11,  (2013) (discussing the “greater 
tolerance for radio tracking of animals,” and suggesting that, “[t]he panopticon is not just for 
people anymore”). 
 123. This perspective is evident in some arguments for captive breeding of animals that are 
on the verge of extinction.  See the New York Times’ online colloquium, Does Captive Breeding 
Distract from Conservation?, July 5, 2012, www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/07/05/does-
captive-breeding-distract-from-conservation. 
 124. There are over 10,000 gray wolves in the U.S. (including Alaska, where the species has 
never been endangered), so the gray wolf is nowhere near the precipice of extinction.  U.S. Fish 
and Wildlife Service, Gray Wolf (Canis Lupus) Biologue, (Dec. 2011), https://www.fws.gov/ 
midwest/wolf/aboutwolves/biologue.htm. 
 125. Although both Benson and Coleman seem to value wildness, they do note that animals 
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However, this fact does not excuse the violation of their privacy, any 
more than a human subject’s ignorance of surveillance excuses the 
violation of human privacy. To condition a privacy-based objection on 
the subject’s full understanding of the surveillance technology at issue 
would disqualify many humans from defending their privacy against 
modern surveillance techniques. The Supreme Court has never 
imposed such a requirement.126  In any event, it seems clear that wolves 
do understand the hardships that result when they wear surveillance 
collars127 (even if the wolves do not comprehend exactly how the collars 
operate.)  For instance,  wolves know when they black out and wake 
up with bulky objects fastened to their necks,128  when they cannot 
roam beyond a confined area,129 and when ineluctable hunters shoot at 
them from helicopters.130  The government’s surveillance of wolves is 
hardly surreptitious.  It is conspicuous and overbearing. 
B.  Other Harms 
The use of surveillance collars on wolves may cause harm to entire 
ecosystems.  For example, one common objective of wildlife managers 
is to limit wolves’ predation on elk, so that human hunters do not face 
competition in pursuing their prey.131  Surveillance collars are quite 
 
are unaware of the surveillance by wildlife researchers.  Coleman, supra note 32, at 82 (observing 
that a typical collared wolf is “clueless to his status as well-monitored subject”); Etienne Benson, 
The Wired Wilderness: Technologies of Tracking and the Making of Modern Wildlife, 3 H-ENV’T 
ROUNDTABLE REV. (2013) (acknowledging that “wild animals are unlikely to be aware that the 
radiotags attached to them are mechanisms of surveillance”). 
 126. The Supreme Court has repeatedly vindicated human privacy rights despite the fact that 
targets of then-novel surveillance techniques were completely unaware of the investigation and 
the technology used in the surveillance.  Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350–53 (1967) (ruling 
that the government’s attachment of a surveillance device to the exterior of a phone booth—a 
cutting-edge surveillance technique at the time—violated the target’s privacy rights); Kyllo v. 
United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34–41 (2001) (similar ruling for thermal imaging device); Jones v. 
United States, 565 U.S. 400, 132 S.Ct. 945, 949 (2012) (similar ruling for a “bumper beeper,” or 
GPS tracking device, secretly attached to defendant’s car without his consent). 
 127. See Benson, supra note 130 (while animals do not understand exactly how electronic 
surveillance works, “[n]onetheless, systems of pervasive, continuous, invisible surveillance 
transform the conditions and quality of their lives, just as they do those of numerous humans”). 
 128. Supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
 129. Supra notes 96–102 and accompanying text. 
 130. Keith Ridler, 20 Wolves Killed in Northern Idaho to Boost Elk Population, FLATHEAD 
BEACON, Feb. 11, 2016 (indicating that Idaho agents shot 20 wolves from a helicopter); Sean 
Cockerham, Collared Wolves Killed During Aerial Predator Control, ALASKA NEWS, Mar. 18, 
2010 (“The Alaska Department of Fish and Game resumed killing wolves from helicopters this 
week in the Interior and immediately sparked controversy by wiping out a pack that included 
wolves collared for research . . . .”). 
 131. Ridler, supra note 130 (reporting that Idaho killed wolves to increase population of elk); 
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effective in segregating wolf and elk populations,132 but this strategy 
can lead to collateral consequences.  When wolves are absent, the elk 
population increases greatly.133  The growing numbers of elk can 
devastate trees and other vegetation that elk eat.134  As a result, other 
species that depend on this vegetation will diminish in number.135  The 
reintroduction of wolves in Yellowstone appears to have brought down 
the elk population and helped to restore balance to the ecosystem, 
although some scientists have disputed whether wolves should be given 
all of the credit for this development.136  Apart from their salutary effect 
in reducing elk browsing of trees at Yellowstone, wolves have helped 
the ecosystem by providing food for several species of scavengers.137  It 
is naive to characterize the wolf as the “hero” of the Yellowstone 
ecosystem,138 because the precise role of wolves in any ecosystem is 
 
see Stephens, supra note 33 at 936 (“In a region where hunting is often engrained in the culture, 
hunters classify wolves ‘land piranhas,’ fearing that they will devastate local game populations 
and deprive them of prized animals such as elk”); Emel, supra note 111, at 102 (one purpose of 
wolf eradication has been “to sustain big game animals so that human hunters could kill them”). 
 132. Collars allow wildlife managers to keep wolves in designated areas.  Supra note 95–102 
Collars also allow managers to determine which wolves are attacking elk.  Johnson, supra note 
63.  Managers can then use the collars to track and kill the wolves quickly.  See, e.g., Ridler, supra 
note 130. 
 133. Scientists have found an inverse relationship between the size of the wolf population and 
the size of the elk population at Yellowstone.  The wolves either prey on or scare away elk.  See 
www.yellowstonepark.com/gray-wolves-impact-elk/ (last visited July 18, 2016). 
 134. William Ripple, et al., Trophic Cascades among Wolves, Elk and Aspen on Yellowstone 
National Park’s Northern Range, 102 BIOLOGICAL CONSERVATION 227, 232–33 (2001) 
(discussing evidence that Yellowstone wolves helped to restore trees by killing or scaring elk that 
were browsing on the trees). 
 135. Id. (explaining that influence of wolves extends to several trophic levels and benefits 
other species that elk had adversely affected, e.g., by reducing their food supply or nesting areas); 
William Ripple and Robert Beschta, Trophic Cascades in Yellowstone: The First Fifteen Years 
after Wolf Reintroduction, 145 BIOLOGICAL CONSERVATION 205, 211–13 (2011) (indicating that 
presence of wolves in Yellowstone helped beavers and bison by limiting elk browsing). 
 136. Kristin Marshall, et al., Interactions Among Herbivory, Climate, Topography and Plant 
Age Shape Riparian Willow Dynamics in Northern Yellowstone National Park, USA, 102 J. 
ECOLOGY 667, 676–77 (2014) (discussing complex interrelationship of several variables, not just 
wolves, as explanation for increased growth of willows and related effects at Yellowstone). 
 137. Christopher Wilmers and Wayne Getz, Gray Wolves as Climate Change Buffers in 
Yellowstone, PLOS BIOLOGY, Mar. 15, 2005, www.journals.plos.org (last visited on July 18, 2016) 
(observing that wolves can help scavengers by providing late-winter carrion); see generally 
William Ripple, et al., Status and Ecological Effects of the World’s Largest Carnivores, 343 
SCIENCE 151 (2014) (reviewing several studies providing evidence of “trophic cascades” 
attributable to the size of large predator populations in various ecosystems). 
 138. According to Arthur Middleton, a postdoctoral fellow at the Yale School of Forestry and 
Environmental Studies, the characterization of wolves as the lynchpin of the Yellowstone 
ecosystem is too facile.  Arthur Middleton, Is the Wolf a Real American Hero?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
9, 2014 (suggesting that prior earlier studies overlooked possible alternative explanations). 
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difficult for scientists to determine,139 but this uncertainty is exactly why 
scientists should be wary of using surveillance collars to manipulate 
wolf populations.140 
Does the collaring of wolves cause harm to humans?  Collaring 
may fan the flames of anti-wolf hysteria, which is dangerous to wolves 
and humans alike.  Some Americans harbor a “deep ancestral hostility 
to wolves.”141  Those who feel this contempt may see surveillance 
collars as a tool for subjugating the species—keeping wolves a safe 
distance from humanity142—and ensuring that wolves are quickly 
accessible as soon as the law permits a cull.143  According to Professor 
Jody Emel at Clark University, “[w]ild animals, and particularly 
predators like the wolf. . . have been targets for hatred, the same hatred 
that launched armies and lynch mobs against human ‘others.’”144  Emel 
has stressed the urgency of challenging  prejudice against wolves: 
[F]or many of us, wolves and wilderness are symbols of resistance.  
These animals are metaphors for oppositional ways of thinking and 
feeling.  Passion for their survival results from not anesthetizing 
oneself to the oppression of animals and its links to other forms and 
sites of oppression. . . To leave unexamined the structures [of 
prejudice] that teach us to slice off or repress empathy and to 
distance ourselves from the “other,” invites oppression, brutality, 
holocaust. . . The license to hate and aggress guaranteed by both 
racism and speciesism is written in one paranoid and sadistic hand.145 
Other authors have equated antipathy toward wolves with 
mistreatment of various human groups.146  Man’s contempt for wolves 
 
 139. Marshall, supra note 136; Middleton, supra note 138. 
 140. Duane, supra note 13 (criticizing hubris of those who believe they can manipulate 
environment as if they were merely removing and replacing bricks in a Lego structure). 
 141. Verlyn Klinkenborg, Science, Mythology, Hatred, and the Fate of the Gray Wolf, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 12, 2009 (describing some Americans’ deep-seated, irrational hatred of wolves). 
 142. Supra notes 95–100. 
 143. In states like Idaho, wildlife managers seemed poised to slaughter collared wolves to the 
extent that the federal rules allow them to do so.  See supra note 25–27.  Critics have argued that 
these managers collar wolves in order to track and kill the animals.  Supra note 107; infra n. 151. 
 144. Id. at 102. 
 145. Id. at 112. 
 146. See, e.g, TURNER, supra note 65, 60–61 (“Wolves were humiliated, mutilated, and 
tortured, often with what can only be described as glee.  The historical record suggests not defense 
but sadism.  There are inexplicable, irrational hatreds hidden in the human soul that are eternally 
fresh, the blend of fear and ignorance we see in Rwanda, Bosnia, Palestine, and Kashmir.  Wolves 
suffer from the same blend of fear, hatred and ignorance”); see Thomas Kuhne, The Claims of 
Community, in PETER HAYES, ED., HOW WAS IT POSSIBLE: A HOLOCAUST READER 129 (U. 
Nebraska Press 2015) (“Germany was infected with a germ that causes its people to treat their 
victims as if they were wolves”) (internal quotes omitted); see Aviva Cantor, The Club, The Yoke 
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belies the reality that human nature can be every bit as vicious as lupine 
nature.147  Ironically, the demonizing and attempted segregation of 
wolves brings out in humans the very qualities that humans deplore in 
wolves. 
A related irony is that humans actually reduce their own privacy 
vís-a-vís wolves when they show disrespect for wolves’ privacy.  
Evidence indicates that the more humans intrude in the world of 
wolves, the more habituated wolves become to human contact, and the 
more likely wolves will venture into areas populated by humans.148  
Thus, one of the primary arguments offered by the anti-wolf lobby in 
favor of surveillance collars—that they can minimize wolves’ contact 
with humans—may be fallacious.  If extensive human contact with 
collared wolves is necessary for installing and maintaining the 
 
and the Leash: What We Can Learn from Patriarchy’s Treatment of Animals, quoted in CHARLES 
PATTERSON, ETERNAL TREBLINKA: OUR TREATMENT OF ANIMALS AND THE HOLOCAUST 12 
(Lantern 2002) (“Nowhere is patriarchy’s iron fist as naked as in the oppression of animals, which 
serves as the model and training ground for all other forms of oppression”); MORTIMER ADLER, 
THE DIFFERENCE OF MAN AND THE DIFFERENCE IT MAKES 265 (Fordham U. Press 1993) 
(“Why, then, should not groups of superior men be able to justify their enslavement, exploitation, 
or even genocide of inferior human groups on factual and moral grounds on those we now rely 
on to justify our treatment of the animals [that we classify] as dangerous predators?”) (brackets 
added). 
 147. Professor Jon Coleman’s apt title for his 2008 book, VICIOUS: WOLVES AND MEN IN 
AMERICA, conveys his thesis: this adjective describes not only the wolves inhabiting the North 
American continent, but also the humans who hunted and trapped them.  COLEMAN supra note 
32 at 1–15 (exploring motives for human extirpation of wolves, and drawing certain parallels 
between wolves and humans).  In a similar vein, the noted historian William Cronon at the 
University of Wisconsin has pointed out how wolves’ attributes reflect human attributes in many 
ways.  William Cronon, Foreword: A Strange Violent Intimacy, in BRETT WALKER, THE LOST 
WOLVES OF JAPAN xi–xiv (U. Washington Press 2009). 
 148. See, e.g., Colette Drworiz, Banff National Park to Consider Restraints on Wildlife 
Photography after Wolf Put Down, CALGARY HERALD, June 15, 2016 (reporting that in Banff 
National Park, more frequent interaction between wolves and humans leads to “habituation” that 
emboldens wolves to venture near human communities); see also Website of Washington 
Department of Fish and Wildlife, Gray Wolf Conservation and Management, http://wdfw.wa.gov/ 
conservation/gray_wolf/humans_pets.html (last visited on July 18, 2016) (“Wolves can become 
habituated to humans in areas where they regularly encounter humans”); see generally Diane 
Boyd, Wolf Habituation as a Conservation Conundrum, companion website for PRINCIPLES OF 
CONSERVATION BIOLOGY (Sinauer 2006),  http://sites.sinauer.com/groom/article.php?id=24  
(last visited on July 18, 2016) (indicating that “an increase in human-wolf interaction may result 
in harm to humans”). 
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surveillance equipment,149 as well as moving “problem” wolves,150 than 
the collars may be compounding the problem of human-wolf conflicts 
in the long term. 
III.  INADEQUACY OF CURRENT REGULATION 
Given the potentially harmful effects of wolf surveillance listed 
above, why hasn’t the government adopted uniform rules limiting the 
use of surveillance collars?  Part of the answer lies in the diffuse nature 
of the current regulations for wildlife telemetry.  There is a patchwork 
of rules imposing varying restrictions depending on the location of the 
surveillance and the affiliation of the personnel conducting the 
surveillance.  These quirks—combined with the willingness of some 
state officials to flout existing rules—have created an environment in 
which surveillance of wolves can occur with little accountability. 
The regulations of federal agencies with jurisdiction over wolf 
habitats contain rules governing wolf surveillance.  For example, the 
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, the National Park Service and the U.S. 
Forest Service have jurisdiction over vast areas that include the ranges 
of several wolf packs.151  The Code of Federal Regulations authorizes 
these agencies and their delegatees to use surveillance collars on 
wolves,152 but provides scant guidance concerning the procedures for 
 
 149. Humans sometimes need to handle wolves extensively in the initial capture and collaring 
process.  See, e.g., Wyoming v. Livingston, 443 F.3d 1211, 1214 (10th Cir. 2006) (noting that the 
process of capture and collaring can sometimes take a long time because wildlife officials move 
the captured wolves to a central location before returning them to their packs). Then humans 
periodically need to change the batteries and otherwise maintain the surveillance equipment.  
Mech, supra note 60, at 8–9 (noting that retrapping may be necessary for replacement of batteries 
or recollaring). 
 150. Mark Phillips, who had responsibility for collaring and managing a large number of 
reintroduced wolves, indicated that he had to intervene so frequently that he felt his role was 
analogous to that of a “zookeeper.”  Loder supra note 104. 
 151. Wolves wear surveillance collars on land controlled by all three of these agencies.  See, 
e.g. Brief of Appellee United States in Wyoming  v. Jiminez, 2004 WL 312771 *i  (10th Cir. Dec. 
6, 2004) (indicating that for the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, “radio collaring of reintroduced 
wolves is an essential component of wolf control under the Wolf Reintroduction Program”); 
National Park Service, WOLF MONITORING 1986-2014 (2014) (“More than 400 wolves have been 
captured and collared” in Denali National Park alone); WILLIAM RODGERS, ENVT. L. INDIAN 
COUNTRY 1:27 (2016) (noting that on land controlled by the Forest Service in Idaho, “biologists 
trap wolves and place radio collars around the animals’ necks”). 
 152. For example, the Department of Interior’s regulations allow surveillance collars as one 
possible means of monitoring reintroduced wolves. 50 CFR §17.84(iii)(8) (“The reintroduced 
wolves will be monitored during the life of the project, including by the use of radio telemetry”).  
See Appellee’s brief filed with U.S. Supreme Court in Wyoming v. Jiminez on Oct. 6, 2006, 
available on Westlaw at 2006 WL 2849234 *2 (noting the duty of federal officials to monitor 
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assessing applications, reviewing ongoing operations, or sanctioning 
unauthorized use.  The paucity of procedural regulations is an 
invitation for abuse.  For example, in 2016, the U.S. Forest Service 
permitted the Idaho Department of Fish and Game to land helicopters 
in the Frank Church-River of No Return Wilderness in order to place 
surveillance collars on elk.153  The states’ contractors not only collared 
elk, but also wolves, plainly exceeding the Forest Service’s 
authorization.154  When environmental groups sued in protest,155 state 
officials insisted that the wolf collaring was inadvertent, but that they 
would continue to monitor the improperly collared wolves anyway.156  
This episode illustrates the limited effectiveness of federal regulations 
in constraining the collaring of wolves.157 
An additional set of rules may come into play when collaring 
involves wolves covered by the Endangered Species Act (ESA).158  The 
ESA and its regulations penalize the unauthorized “tak[ing]” of any 
 
wolves, and indicating that the officials do so “primarily by fitting the wolves with radio collars”). 
 153. Court Rules That Forest Service Illegally Authorized Helicopter Intrusions in Premiere 
Wilderness Area, Earthjustice (Jan. 19, 2017), http://earthjustice.org/news/press/2017/court-rules-
that-forest-service-illegally-authorized-helicopter-intrusions-in-premiere-wilderness-area. 
 154. Rocky Barker, Idaho Fish and Game Breaks Agreement, Uses Helicopter to Collar 
Wolves in Wilderness, IDAHO STATESMAN, Jan. 13, 2016 (“An Idaho Department of Fish and 
Game crew using a helicopter in the Frank Church-River of No Return Wilderness to attach radio 
collars to elk broke an agreement with the U.S. Forest Service and collared four wolves”). 
 155. Earthjustice attorney Tim Preso accused the Idaho Fish and Game officials of collaring 
the wolves as part of a long-term plan to exterminate them.  “There is every reason to believe that 
these new wolf collars will be used by a state trapper to locate wolves for the purpose of killing 
them . . .”  Tim Preso, Idaho Breaks Agreement Using Helicopter Drops to Collar Wolves in Frank 
Church Wilderness, Jan. 13, 2016, on Earthjustice.org (last visited on July 8, 2016). 
 156. Rob Chaney, Idaho Fish and Game Will Keep Monitoring Wolves Improperly Collared 
in Wilderness, DAILY MISSOULIAN, Jan. 21, 2016 (quoting IDFG spokesman Mike Keckler, who 
said, “The only way to remove those collars would be to go back in with helicopters”).  Idaho 
officials’ hostility to wolves is no secret.  The Idaho Legislature has declared that, “It is the policy 
of the state of Idaho to use every option to assert state sovereignty and mitigate the impact of 
gray wolves on residents of the state. . .” Quoted in WILLIAM RODGERS, ENVT. L. INDIAN 
COUNTRY 1:27 (2016).  The Idaho governor has called for killing most of the wolves in the state’s 
boundaries, and he said that “I’m prepared to bid for that first ticket to shoot a wolf myself.”  Jim 
Robbins, For Wolves, A Recovery May Not Be the Blessing It Seems, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2007 
(reporting governor’s plan to reduce wolf population from 650 to 100). 
 157. See Eric Barker, Fish and Game Taken to Task Over Wilderness Copter Flights, 
LEWISTON TRIBUNE, Jan. 21, 2016 (indicating that Forest Service documented the 
noncompliance of Idaho officials without taking enforcement action); but see Babcock, infra n. 
283 (discussion intervention of federal court after environmentalists sued). 
 158. In some parts of the U.S., such as Alaska, wolves are not subject to the ESA.  Lance 
Richardson, Wolves May Be Losing a Nasty Political Battle, SLATE, Feb. 21, 2014, http:// 
www.slate.com/blogs/wild_things/2014/02/21/gray_wolf_endangered_species_act_conflict_should
_fish_and_wildlife_service.html 
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endangered species,159 which applies to capturing or otherwise harming 
such a species.160  As noted previously, the collaring of wolves often 
entails capture and other harms,161 so the technique could arguably 
violate the ESA.162  Regulations under the ESA establish a procedure 
through which federal agencies may obtain permits to place 
surveillance collars on endangered or threatened species.163  The 
regulations include a short list of evaluative criteria, but are very 
general and omit any mention of privacy.164  The regulations allow the 
routine collaring of gray wolves because they have a “non-essential” 
status under the ESA,165 and therefore are not subject to the strictest 
protections.166  In general, the applicability of the ESA depends on 
political considerations. The unpopularity of wolves makes them 
vulnerable to “delisting” (i.e., exemption from certain protections 
under the ESA).167  For example, the Fish and Wildlife Service decided 
 
 159. See generally, Paul Boudreaux, Understanding “Take” in the Endangered Species Act, 34 
AZ. ST. L. J. 733, 735-41 (2004) (explaining ESA and “take” provisions in detail). 
 160. The term “take” means “to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, 
or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct.”  16 U.S.C. §1532(19). 
 161. Zoe Jewell, a researcher at Duke’s Nicholas School of the Environment, has noted that 
“invasive techniques, relying on capture and immobilization for marking or tagging, can 
negatively impact species in a variety of ways.”  Zoe Jewell, quoted in Using—and Sharing—New 
Technologies Is Key for Conservation, DUKE TODAY, Oct. 5, 2015, https://today.duke.edu/2015/ 
10/pimm-consv-tech-release-sh-kl (last visited on July 9, 2016) (advocating that researchers 
instead rely on non-invasive techniques such as footprint analysis). 
 162. Jewell made the following comment on ResearchGate, an online community of 
researchers: “ I agree surgery is certainly not an option for an endangered species.”  Has Anyone 
Ever Tried to Attach a Radio Transmitter on a Fossorial Species?, www.researchgate.net, Feb. 14, 
2015 (last visited on July 9, 2016). 
 163. See 50 CFR §17.22 (establishing procedural requirements for endangered species); 50 
CFR §17.32 (establishing a procedure for threatened species). 
 164. E.g. 50 CFR §17.22(a)(2) (brief listing criteria used in reviewing applications to obtain 
permits for scientific purposes or for the enhancement of propagation or survival) 
 165. Williams, supra note 35 (explaining that Interior Secretary Bruce Babbitt sought the 
ESA’s classification of “non-essential experimental population” for transplanted wolves because 
“without such a designation, wolf recovery was impossible”). 
 166. 50 CFR §17.84(iii)(8) (allowing use of surveillance collars to monitor reintroduced 
wolves); Brief of Appellee United States in Wyoming  v. Jiminez, filed on Dec. 6, 2014 (“Federal 
regulations implementing the ESA require the monitoring of reintroduced wolves, and the 
regulations specify radio collaring as an appropriate monitoring method”). 
 167. The politicization of the delisting process under the ESA is the subject of extensive 
scholarship.  E.g., Hope Babcock, The Sad Story of the Northern Rocky Mountain Gray Wolf 
Reintroduction Program, 24 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 25, 50 n. 106 (2013) (suggesting that “the 
majority party determines the recovered status of an endangered species purely in response to 
political pressure”); Crystal Anderson, Reconsidering a Weakened Regulation: A Critical Analysis 
of Delisting in the Endangered Species Act, 9 FLA. A & M U. L. REV. 207 (2013) (contending that 
Congress undermined the ESA for reasons of political expediency). 
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to delist gray wolves in Idaho, Montana, and Wyoming, among other 
areas because of pressure from Congress.168  Ironically, under the ESA, 
an agency might spend millions of dollars collaring and protecting 
wolves, only to abruptly switch to authorizing the slaughter of the same 
wolves once they lose their protected status.169 
The Animal Welfare Act (“AWA”) also potentially governs the 
use of surveillance collars on wolves.  Passed primarily to protect the 
welfare of animals in laboratory testing,170 this statute also includes 
provisions that could apply to wildlife in field research.  For example, 
researchers are supervised by institutional animal care and use 
committees (“IACUCs”) that review protocols to ensure animal 
cruelty is not excessive.171  However, the AWA’s procedures have not 
been effective in limiting the use of surveillance collars on wolves for 
numerous reasons.  First, and most fundamentally, the AWA protects 
against  excessive infliction of physical pain, but does not purport to 
protect privacy.172  By allowing prolonged experimentation on animals 
in laboratories, the AWA sets a very low bar for impermissible 
constraints on animals’ freedom.  Second, the AWA regulations are 
highly permissive for any research classified as a “field study,”173 and 
 
 168. Somerset Perry, The Gray Wolf Delisting Rider and State Management Under the 
Endangered Species Act, 39 ECOLOGY L.Q. 439, 441 (2012) (“Politicians in Idaho, Montana and 
Wyoming repeatedly called for gray wolf delisting”).  Pressured by Congress, the U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife acceded to these demands, but environmental groups filed lawsuits that led to partial 
modification of the delisting.  See generally Martha Williams, Lessons from the Wolf Wars: 
Recovery vs. Delisting Under the Endangered Species Act, 27 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 106, 131-
46  (2015) (discussing delisting in Wyoming and Western Great Lakes region).  President Trump’s 
nominee for secretary of the interior, Ryan Zinke, has “consistently supported harmful, anti-
wildlife legislation that would severely undermine the Endangered Species Act and remove or 
block protections for hundreds of imperiled species, including gray wolves . . .”  Timothy Cama, 
Trump Picks GOP Rep. Zinke for Interior Secretary, THE HILL, Dec. 15, 2016 (quoting Jamie 
Rappaport, president of Defenders of Wildlife). 
 169. Ketcham, supra note 112 (“After spending upward of $40 million studying the animals—
then capturing, collaring, tracking, and protecting them—the federal government last year 
scheduled wolves to be killed in huge numbers.”) 
 170. Jonathan Lindzey, et al., A Unique Application to the IACUC for Studies of Wild Animals 
in or from Natural Settings, 24 CONTEMPORARY TOPICS 33, 33-34 (2002) (noting that AWA 
originally regulated the treatment of lab animals, and only later came to regulate treatment of 
animals in field research, so the AWA procedures are not well suited for the latter context). 
 171. 9 CFR §2.31(d)(1) (“In order to approve proposed activities or proposed significant 
changes in ongoing activities, the IACUC shall conduct a review of those components of the 
activities related to the care and use of animals and determine that the proposed activities are in 
accordance with this subchapter unless acceptable justification for a departure is presented”). 
 172. 9 CFR §1.1 (defining physical pain for purposes of AWA, and excluding brief pain caused 
by procedures such as injections; definition makes no mention of psychological harm). 
 173. 9 CFR §2.31(d)(1) (exempting field studies from certain categories of IACUC review).  
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animal telemetry generally falls into this category.174  Third, the AWA 
does not call for follow-up review of any field research approved by an 
IACUC, even field research considered too invasive to qualify as a 
field study.175  Fourth, the AWA’s narrow scope does not cover enough 
categories of professionals and activities to regulate all use of 
surveillance collars on wolves.176  Finally, some researchers subject to 
the AWA may resent their accountability to IACUCs, which could 
hinder the IACUC’s effectiveness in supervising wildlife 
surveillance.177  For the foregoing reasons, “compliance with the 
 
Jon Geller, director of the Veterinary Emergency and Rehabilitation Hospital in Fort Collins, 
Colorado, and former member of an IACUC in the National Park Service, has criticized the 
AWA’s permissive treatment of field studies, which “gain summary IACUC approval because 
they presumptively do not cause pain or distress, or significantly alter the behavior of the animals 
being studied, and are intended to be mostly observational in nature.”  According to Geller, “field 
studies may not be as benign as depicted.” Jon Geller, Field Mortalities in Wildlife Research: It’s 
Time for a Conversation, posted on the website of the Humane Society Veterinary Medical 
Association, July 21, 2014, available at www.havsma.org/field_mortalities_in_wildlife_research# 
-V38E2DfW_AE (last visited on July 7, 2016).  A group of mammalogists headed by Professor 
Robert Sikes at the University of Arkansas-Little Rock has noted that the AWA’s definitions 
distinguishing “field studies” from other categories of research are ambiguous, and as a result, 
“[c]onsiderable misunderstanding has surrounded the application of the AWA to field studies.”  
Robert Sikes, et al., Guidelines of the American Society of Mammalogists for the Use of Wild 
Mammals in Research, 97 J. MAMMALOGY  663, 670 (2016). 
 174. According to the regulations adopted by the U.S. Department of Agriculture under the 
AWA, “[f]ield study means any study done on free-living wild animals in their natural habitat, 
which does not involve an invasive procedure, and which does not harm or materially alter the 
behavior of the animals under study.”  9 CFR §1.1.; see, e.g.,University of Maryland Center for 
Environmental Science, Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee (IACUC) Field Studies, 
Oct. 21, 2011, www.UMCES.org (last visited on July 8, 2016) (explaining that animal telemetry 
falls under the definition of field study unless surgery is necessary); University of Houston 
Guidelines for Field Research, www.uh.edu/ (last visited on July 8, 2016) (same); Sikes, supra 
note 173, at 670  (indicating that most categories of wildlife observation involving capture at outset 
will still qualify as field studies under USDA regulations pursuant to AWA). 
 175. Geller, supra note 173 (“Principal investigators for government-funded field research 
projects must submit proposed studies to the appropriate Institutional Animal Care and Use 
Committee, or IACUC, to ensure compliance with the Animal Welfare Act.  Unfortunately, 
unlike institutional animal research, there is no protocol for inspection or follow up, often leading 
to unfortunate outcomes that may not be reported.”). 
 176. Tadlock Cowan, Congressional Research Service, The Animal Welfare Act: Background 
and Selected Animal Welfare Legislation, 2, Jan. 5, 2016, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS22493 
.pdf (last visited on July 8, 2016)  (explaining that AWA covers dealers, exhibitors, animal trans-
porters, research facilities, pet stores and organizers of events involving fights between animals). 
 177. Daniel Mulcahy, Does the Animal Welfare Act Apply to Free-Ranging Animals?, 44 INST. 
LAB. ANIMAL RESOURCES J. 252, 255 (2003) (“Government researchers working with free-
ranging animals  . . . may resent the intrusion of AWA-mandated review of their projects.  
IACUC review has only recently been introduced to many federal and state agencies, and some 
researchers view it as unwarranted criticism and an unnecessary additional burden on their 
professional lives.”). 
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[]AWA can be insufficient for government natural resource agencies 
that use free-ranging animals in research and management studies.”178 
Ethical guidelines might apply to the collaring of wolves for 
surveillance, but these guidelines do little to protect wolves’ privacy. 
Generally, there is far less authority on ethical boundaries for wildlife 
research than that concerning ethical boundaries for research involving 
humans.179  Some professional organizations whose members place 
surveillance collars on wolves have ethical codes that regulate the 
practice to varying degrees.  Examples of such organizations include 
the Wildlife Society,180 the Society for Conservation Biologists,181 the 
American Society of Mammalogists,182 and the American 
Psychological Society.183  However, for the most part the language in 
 
 178. Id. at 252. 
 179. See Zoe Jewell, Effect of Monitoring Technique on Quality of Conservation Science, 27 
CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 501, 502 (2013) (pointing out that far fewer articles on research ethics 
appear in conservation and ecology journals than in medical journals). 
 180. THE WILDLIFE SOCIETY, CODE OF ETHICS, date of adoption unknown, available at 
wildlife.org/governance/code-of-ethics/ (last accessed on July 6, 2016).  The code does not address 
animals’ privacy.  Paragraph 4 of the Code urges members to “[e]xercise high standards in the 
care and use of live vertebrate animals used for research, in accordance with accepted professional 
guidelines for the respective classes of animals under study.” 
 181. THE SOCIETY FOR CONSERVATION BIOLOGY, CODE OF ETHICS, adopted in August 
2004, available at www.combio.org/about-scb/who-we-are/code-of-ethics/ (last accessed on July 
10, 2016).  The Code includes general language about animal welfare but omits any mention of 
privacy.  Paragraph 15 of the Code exhorts members to “[a]dhere to the highest standards for 
treatment of animals used in research in a way that contributes most positively to sustaining 
natural populations and ecosystems”). 
 182. For its guidelines, the ASM has adopted a document authored by Robert Sikes, et al., 
Guidelines of the American Society of Mammalogists for the Use of Wild Mammals in Research, 
97 J. MAMMALOGY 663 (2016). This document offers more detail than the other groups’ 
guidelines, and addresses such matters as trapping, tissue sampling, maintenance of wild-caught 
mammals in captivity, and euthanasia, but the ASM guidelines still do not discuss privacy or any 
related concept.  One purpose of the ASM guidelines is to provide a protocol that an IACUC 
might adopt.  The ASM guidelines note that regulations under the AWA do not require IACUC 
review for field studies—including studies that may involve capture at the outset—but some 
agencies that provide grants to wildlife research might insist on IACUC oversight, so IACUC 
review of such studies is inconsistent.  Id. at 670.  The ASM guidelines suggest that researchers 
should seek IACUC review even when not required to do so.  Id. 
 183. AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, GUIDELINES FOR ETHICAL CONDUCT IN 
THE CARE AND USE OF NONHUMAN ANIMALS IN RESEARCH, adopted by the APA Council of 
Representatives on February 24, 2012, available at www.apa.org/science/leadership/care/guidelin 
es.aspx (last visited on July 6, 2016).  “Field research that carries a risk of materially altering the 
behavior of nonhuman animals and/or producing damage to sensitive ecosystems is subject to 
IACUC approval.  Field research, if strictly observational, may not require animal care committee 
approval . . . Psychologists conducting field research should disturb their populations as little as 
possible, while acting consistent with the goals of research.  Every effort should be made to 
minimize potential harmful effects of the student on the population and on other plant and animal 
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these guidelines is very general, and does not address the need to 
protect the privacy of wildlife.184  Moreover, these professional 
organizations do not have the means to enforce their ethical codes 
effectively:  they lack the power of licensure, and their strongest 
sanction is censuring or suspending members, which does not prevent 
the violators from engaging in further wildlife research.185  Some of 
these organizations’ publications have set forth guidelines that could 
be effective if widely adopted and enforced.186  However, for the most 
part the role of professional organizations is to share information about 
best practices rather than to compel compliance with protocols. 
In sum, the present approach to regulating wolf surveillance is 
inadequate in many respects.  The rules that exist lack uniformity.  
They leave large gaps in which wolf collaring can occur with little  
 
 
species in the area.”  (cross-referencing other regulation such as the AWA and the ESA.) 
 184. Only one of the codes listed here, the APA code, makes any reference to privacy, and 
that reference concerns the privacy of humans who are near field research projects.  “Research in 
populated areas must be done with respect for the property and privacy or the inhabitants of the 
area.”  Id.  While this sentence does not refer explicitly to humans, the context makes clear that 
humans are the focus: because only humans own property.  The codes of both the Wildlife Society 
and the Society of Conservation Biologists provide that members should protect the rights of 
humans (presumably including privacy), but the codes have no comparable language for animals.  
WILDLIFE SOCIETY, CODE OF ETHICS, ¶5; SOCIETY OF CONSERVATION BIOLOGISTS, CODE OF 
ETHICS, ¶14. 
 185. To put it differently, membership in these organizations is not a condition for 
professionals to practice, as it is the case for state bar associations, which can suspend or disbar 
members and thereby prevent them from practicing altogether (at least within a particular state).  
Indeed, the organizations listed here accept members who are not even practitioners of 
conservation science.  See, e.g., WILDLIFE SOCIETY, www.wildlife.org/join/ (last visited on July 
10, 2016) (“Membership is open to wildlife professionals, students and supporters who are 
interested in wildlife science, management and conservation”); SOCIETY FOR CONSERVATION 
BIOLOGY, www.combio.org/membership/become-a-member/ (last visited on July 10, 2016) (“The 
Society For Conservation Biology has been advancing the science and practicing of conserving 
the Earth’s biological diversity since 1985 and represents conservation professionals and students 
worldwide . . . If you are working to prevent loss of biodiversity—no matter where you are in your 
career or in the world—this is your professional community”); AMERICAN SOCIETY OF 
MAMMALOGISTS, www.mammalsociety.org/ membership/ (last visited on July 10, 2016) 
(“Anyone interested in mammalogy may become a member of the American Society of 
Mammalogists upon payment of dues”). 
 186. For example, the ASM has published a set of guidelines that IACUCs could use in 
reviewing proposals for research involving wildlife.  Sikes, supra note 173, at 670.  The ASM has 
collaborated with the Ornithological Council to develop a template that researchers can use when 
submitting such proposals to IACUCs.  This form is accessible at http://ornithologyexchange.org/ 
articles/_/community/new-model-protocol-form-for-wildlife-research-now-available-r150.  As 
noted previously, however, telemetry may qualify as a field study that is automatically exempt 
from IACUC review, even though ASM urges its members to submit their protocols to IACUCs. 
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regulation.  To the extent that guidelines apply, they tend to be general 
in nature, and do not mention animals’ privacy. 
IV.  TOWARD A CONCEPTION OF WILDLIFE PRIVACY 
Neither the U.S. Constitution nor any statute recognizes an 
animal’s legally enforceable privacy right.187  Animals have no rights at 
all.188 The constitutional doctrine of privacy protects against 
interference with a privately owned animal to the extent that the owner 
asserts this right,189 but the animal has no claim to privacy independent 
of the owner’s right,190 and even the derivative privacy right sometimes 
yields to other priorities.191  In some jurisdictions, the law deems wild 
animals to be the property of the government,192 so government 
 
 187. James Grimadli, National Zoo Cites Privacy Concerns in Its Refusal to Release Animal’s 
Medical Records, WASH. POST, May 6, 2002, p. E3 (“The notion that animals have a right to 
privacy is, from a legal standpoint odd, because courts have long held that they don’t”). 
 188. According to Hope Babcock of Georgetown, “The law is clear”: “animals have no legally 
cognizable right.”  Hope Babcock, A Brook with Legal Rights: The Rights of Nature in Court, 43 
ECOLOGY L. Q. 1, 39 (2016) (internal citations omitted).  Accord Cara Feinberg, HARVARD 
TODAY, Mar.-Apr. 2016 (animals are property and have no rights); Annie Dryden, Overcoming 
the Inadequacies of Animal Cruelty Statutes and the Property-Based View of Animals, 38 IDAHO 
L. REV. 177, 178 (2001) (“As property, animals logically lack ‘rights’”). 
 189. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Hurd, 743 N.E.2d 841, 844-45 (Mass. App. 2001) (in 
prosecution for animal cruelty, defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy that protected 
against government’s attempts to view condition of animal); see generally Jenni James, When Is 
Rescue Necessary?  Applying the Necessity Defense to the Rescue of Animals, 7 STAN. J. ANIMAL 
L. 1, 33 (2014) (observing that “judges frequently find that the privacy interest of an animal 
enterprise outweighs the right of an animal not to suffer,” so animal rights’ activists cannot invoke 
necessity defense to overcome animal abusers’ reliance on trespass and privacy laws). 
 190. Humans tend to invoke privacy rights with respect to animals if the invocation of privacy 
would benefit the humans.  For example, the National Zoo denied the Washington Post access to 
the medical records of a recently deceased giraffe, asserting that disclosure would violate the 
animal’s privacy rights.  Martin Halstuk Shielding Private Lives from Prying Eyes: The Escalating 
Conflict between Constitutional Privacy and the Accountability Principle of Democracy, 11 
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS. 71, 95 (2003); see James Grimadli, National Zoo Cites Privacy 
Concerns in Its Refusal to Release Animal’s Medical Records, WASH. POST, May 6, 2002, E3 (“‘The 
problem with standing is we have to assert human interests when it is the animal that has been 
adversely affected,’ said the [Animal Defense Fund’s] managing attorney, Wendy Anderson”). 
 191. See, e.g., Martha Neil, City Wins Federal Civil Rights Case over Police Shooting of Dog 
Attacked by Pit Bull, ABA J., June 13, 2015 (reporting that federal jury found for defendant when 
plaintiff sued city alleging seizure  in violation of Fourth Amendment privacy rights after 
colorblind police officer shot and killed plaintiff’s dog; officer mistakenly thought was a pit bull 
that posed a safety risk, and this earnest belief was sufficient to overcome plaintiff’s rights); see 
also State v. Newcomb, ___ P.3d. —-, 2016 WL 3476247 *4-9 (Or. June 16, 2016) (rejecting 
defendant’s claim that privacy right prohibited government from seizing and drawing blood from 
defendant’s dog). 
 192. See, e.g., David Warner, Environmental Endgame: Destruction for Amusement and a 
Sustainable Civilization, 9 S.C. ENVTL. L. J. 1, 56 (2000) (indicating that wild animals are property 
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officials are free to control wildlife with virtually no legal constraints 
whatsoever.  The Supreme Court has declared that animals are the 
paradigmatic example of creatures that may be photographed and 
filmed without violating legally cognizable privacy interests.193 
The current lack of constitutional rights for animals should not 
discourage advocates from demanding protection of animals’ privacy.  
Constitutional protections have been under-inclusive for most of this 
country’s history.  For example, the Constitution failed to protect the 
rights of African-Americans until the 1860s194 and the equal rights of 
women were not acknowledged until 1920.195  The Supreme Court did 
not recognize the constitutional right of privacy until the 1960s,196 the 
right of reproductive freedom until 1973,197 and a constitutional 
protection for same-sex marriage until 2015.198  The gradual accretion 
of rights in the U.S. offers some hope that the doctrine of privacy could 
eventually extend to animals. 
There are at least two conceivable strategies for reforming the law 
to protect the privacy of wildlife.  One would be a rights-based 
approach recognizing animals as autonomous creatures entitled to 
some version of dignity rights, including privacy.199  While the idea of 
 
owned by the state); State v. Halverson, 277 N.W.2d 723, 724 (S.D. 1979) (“Wild animals in this 
state are the property of the state”); Recent Case: Interstate Commerce—Control by States—
Prohibition of Exportation of Natural Gas, 25 HARV L. REV. 90, 90 (1911) (discussing “state’s 
property right in wild animals”).  According to David Favre, a law professor at Michigan State 
and one of the nation’s top experts on animal law, “[t]he legal control of wildlife, as recognized 
under the state ownership doctrine, is based on the fundamental premise that state government 
has the power to control the taking (by capturing or killing) of all wild animals found within their 
jurisdiction.”  David Favre, Animal Wildlife Law—An Introduction,. ANIMAL LAW WEB 
CENTER, 2003, available at www.animallaw.info/article/american-wildlife-law-introduction (last 
accessed on July 5, 2016). 
 193. Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S., 1, 5 n.2 (1978) (indicating that animals in a zoo may 
be “filmed and photographed at will by the public or by media reporters”). 
 194. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII (prohibiting slavery), amend. XIV (establishing equal 
protection, among other provisions), and amend. XV (protecting voting rights). 
 195. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIX (allowing women to vote). 
 196. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (recognizing a right of privacy that the 
government violates when it criminalizes the use of contraception). 
 197. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that a woman has a right to terminate her 
pregnancy under certain circumstances). 
 198. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (determining that same-sex couples have 
a constitutional right to marry just as if they were heterosexual couples). 
 199. Steven Wise is one of the foremost advocates for animal rights in the United States.  He 
is the president of the Nonhuman Rights Project.  He grounds his argument for animal rights in a 
Kantian conceptions of autonomy and dignity.  See, e.g., Steven Wise, Hardly a Revolution—The 
Eligibility of Nonhuman Animals for Dignity-Rights in a Liberal Democracy, 22 VT. L. REV. 793, 
861 (1998) (arguing that animals exhibit some of the attributes that Kant and others have deemed 
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conferring some form of rights on nonhumans is appealing in theory,200 
this approach has achieved little success to date,201 perhaps because it 
appears to be a radical departure from the anthropocentric conception 
of rights. 
A second possible strategy would be to protect animals’ privacy as 
a matter of policy, not as a matter of right.202 This strategy might be 
viable if advocates could demonstrate that protecting animals’ privacy 
is a modest and logical extension of current animal welfare statutes.203  
This Article argues that this latter policy-based approach offers the 
best avenue to establish a legal doctrine of wildlife privacy.  
Furthermore, this Article also contends that protection of animals’ 
privacy is a natural corollary—or “penumbra”—of existing statutes. 
A.  Privacy as Integral to Animal Welfare 
Federal and state law currently protect against abusive treatment 
violating the bodily integrity of animals.204  The underlying rationale is 
 
necessary for autonomy and personhood, so animals should be theoretically eligible for some 
version of the dignity rights attendant to autonomy; while this article was not primarily about 
privacy, it did incidentally mention privacy among other dignity rights). 
 200. For an excellent recent discussion of the case for extending rights to nonhumans, see 
Babcock, supra note 188, at 3 (urging that a natural resource should be able to appear in court “in 
its own right to complain of threats to its continued existence”); see also Christopher Stone, 
Should Trees Have Standing?—Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects, 45 S.C. L. REV. 450 
(1972) (envisioning the possibility that trees could sue or intervene in suits). 
 201. Courts in the U.S. have generally rejected such arguments.  Babcock, supra note 194, at 
18 (arguing that nature “cannot gain access to the courts to protect itself”).  In the U.S., no 
constitutional provision at the federal or state level accords dignity rights to animals, but Germany 
amended its constitution in 2012 to include such a provision.  Emily Fitzgerald, [Ape]rsonshood, 
34 REV. LITIG. 337, 351 (2015) (brackets in title of original). 
 202. Legislatures may deal with gaps in the coverage of the U.S. Constitution or state 
constitutions by legislating rights and protections that exceed the constitutional minimums or 
otherwise fill constitutional interstices.  See, e.g., Tom Lininger, Reconceptualizing Confrontation 
after Davis, 85 TEX. L. REV. 271, 291 (2006) (arguing that states should adopt statutes to fill gaps 
in the coverage of the Sixth Amendment); Margaret Paris, Trust, Lies and Interrogation, 3 VA. J. 
SOC. POL’Y & L. 3, 8 (1996) (urging a legislative response to address gaps in the coverage of the 
Fifth Amendment); David Schuman, Taking Rights Seriously: Communitarian Search and 
Seizure, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 583, 603 (1990) (suggesting the same approach to deal with areas 
beyond the scope of the Fourth Amendment). 
 203. Judge Richard Posner has stressed the need for animal advocates to “proceed 
incrementally, building on existing cases and legal concepts, toward [their] goal of radically 
enhanced legal protections for animals.”  Richard Posner, Animal Rights, 110 YALE L. J. 527, 528 
(2000) (brackets added). 
 204. See id. at 539 (referring to federal statute addressing animal welfare as 
“comprehensive”); see also Jeni James, When Is Rescue Necessary?  Applying the Necessity 
Defense to the Rescue of Animals, 7 STAN. J. ANIMAL L. & POL’Y 1, 3 (2014) (“Every state 
prohibits animal cruelty to some extent, with provisions dating back to the 19th century”); Janet 
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clear: it would be inhumane to allow the purposeful infliction of 
suffering on animals.205  Animal cruelty laws generally prevent physical 
mistreatment of nonhuman creatures where such mistreatment is 
grossly disproportionate to the benefits humans derive from the 
activity at issue.206  Specifically, laws exist to protect wild animals 
against poaching,207 certain categories of scientific experimentation,208 
mistreatment in  activities that implicate interstate commerce.209  Other 
laws safeguard the health of endangered species.210  While critics have 
raised valid complaints about the limited scope of animal welfare  
 
 
 
 
 
McDonald, Defending Those Who Cannot Speak: Civil and Criminal Prosecution of Animal 
Abuse, 88-NOV FLA. BAR J. 30, 30 (2014) (“Animal cruelty, neglect, and abandonment laws are 
codified in every state”).  For a complete list of laws regulating cruelty to animals, see the website 
of the Michigan State University College of Law’s Animal Legal and Historical Center, 
www.animallaw.info/site/comparative-tables (last visted on July 5, 2016). 
 205. See United States v. Stevens, 599 U.S. 460, 495–96 (2010) (Alito, J., dissenting) (declaring 
that the government “has a compelling interest in preventing the torture depicted in crush 
videos”); cf. Posner, supra note 203, at 534 (suggesting that, within a utilitarian framework that 
posits a moral duty to maximize happiness, “it seems axiomatic that people should be forbidden 
to mistreat those animals that have a sufficiently developed nervous system to be able to 
experience pain”). 
 206. Humane Soc’y v. Lyng, 633 F. Supp. 480, 486 (W.D.N.Y. 1986) (“It has long been the 
public policy of this country to avoid unnecessary cruelty to animals.”): Gary Francione, Animals, 
Property and Legal Welfarism: ‘Unnecessary’ Suffering and the ‘Humane’ Treatment, 46 RUTGERS 
L. REV. 721, 723 (1994) (“There are, of course, many laws on the federal and state levels that 
purport to protect animals from ‘inhumane’ treatment, but these laws do not really confer rights 
in the sense that we usually use that term. Rather, these laws concern animal welfare, or the notion 
that animals may be exploited by humans as long as the exploitation does not result in the 
infliction of ‘unnecessary’ pain, suffering, or death.”). 
 207. See, e.g., Ruth Musgrave et al., The Status of Poaching in the United States—Are We 
Protecting Our Wildlife, 33 NAT. RESOURCES J. 977, 985–1002 (1993) (reviewing federal and state 
laws that restrict poaching); Christine Fisher, Conspiring to Violate the Lacey Act, 32 ENVT’L L. 
475, 485–500 (2002) (explaining the provisions of the Lacey Act, which criminalizes trafficking in 
certain categories of wildlife). 
 208. See Fitzgerald, supra note 207 (summarizing many different nations’ laws concerning 
animal testing, and concluding that “banning the use of non-human animals in scientific testing 
and invasive experimentation has become the norm”). 
 209. See Posner, supra note 203, at 539 (“The Animal Welfare Act provides comprehensive 
federal protection of wild animals.”); but see Carole Nowiicki, The Animal Welfare Act: All Bark 
and No Bite, 23 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 443, 477 (1999) (expressing concern that “the AWA only 
regulates research facilities, exhibitors, and dealers of animals in interstate commerce”). 
 210. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (2012) (declaring that a congressional purpose in passing the 
Endangered Species Act was to protect endangered species from harm). 
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statutes,211 it is undeniable that the law now offers some protection for 
the physical integrity of animals. 
Once one accepts the premise that the law should protect animals’ 
corporeal integrity, it is a small additional step to support the 
protection of animals’ privacy.  Animals need privacy to thrive.212  Alan 
Westin, a professor at Columbia, summarized the scientific evidence 
concerning the value of privacy to animals: 
One basic finding of animal studies is that virtually all animals seek 
periods of individual seclusion or small-group intimacy.  This is 
usually described as the tendency toward territoriality, in which an 
organism lays private claim to an area of land, water, or air and 
defends it against intrusion by members of its own species.213 
Adam Moore of the University of Washington indicated privacy may 
be a matter of life and death in the animal kingdom: 
To get a sense of the importance of privacy and separation, it is 
helpful to consider similar interests shared by many non-human 
animals . . . . [E]cological studies demonstrat[e] that a lack of private 
space, due to overpopulation and the like, will threaten survival.  In 
such conditions, animals may kill each other or engage in suicidal 
reductions of their population . . . Moreover, these results hold 
across a wide range of species, supporting the connection that having 
the ability to separate, like food and water, is a necessity of life.214 
According to Professor Westin, “[t]here have to be moments ‘off-
stage.’” Westin recognized that, “[t]o be ‘on’ always would destroy the 
organism.”215 
 
 
 211. See, e.g., James, supra note 210, at 3 (“Actual [animal] protection, however, exists more 
in theory than in practice.  Anti-cruelty laws are often limited in scope, and protection varies 
according to an animal’s species and economic utility.”); Darian M. Ibrahim, The Anticruelty 
Statute: A Student in Animal Welfare, 1 J. ANIMAL L. & ETHICS 175, 176 (2006) (contending that 
anticruelty statutes “do not challenge the majority of modern practices that exploit animals”). 
 212. Henry F. Fradellla et al., Quanitfying Katz: Empirically Measuring “Reasonable 
Expectations of Privacy” in the Fourth Amendment, 38 AM. J. CRIM. L. 289, 301 (2011) (“Although 
privacy is a concept that is often perceived as being a unique characteristic of human beings, 
several decades of growing evidence suggest human and animals both share biological needs for 
privacy”).  Animals find privacy to be beneficial even though they do not value it for the same 
reason reasons that humans do.  For an excellent discussion of the reasons why privacy is valuable 
to humans, see Julie Cohen, What Is Privacy For?, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1905–1911 (2013). 
 213. ALAN WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 8 (Atheneum 1967); see Peter Klopfer & 
Daniel Robenstein, The Concept of Privacy and Its Biological Bases, 33 J. SOC. ISSUES 52, 64 
(1977) (“In sum, there are innumerable instances of nonhuman animals acting in a manner that 
characterizes humans seeking privacy.”). 
 214. ADAM MOORE, PRIVACY RIGHTS: MORAL AND LEGAL FOUNDATIONS 47-48 (Penn St. 
U. Press 2010) (internal citations omitted). 
 215. WESTIN, supra note 219, at 35. 
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The necessity of privacy for survival is even clearer when 
considering the full range of animals’ activities requiring some degree 
of privacy.  Mating usually occurs in private.216  Child rearing is also 
highly private,217 as some animals will abandon their young altogether 
in response to intrusion.218 Animals build or find secluded residences—
sometimes permanent, sometimes temporary—because they have a 
physiological need to rest periodically without disturbance.219 Injured 
animals need solitude in order to recuperate.220  Many animals pursue 
prey stealthily, needing privacy to hunt.221  These are but some of the 
reasons demonstrating why privacy is a basic necessity for virtually all 
animals, many of whom “will die without it.”222 
 
 216. JUDITH DECEW, IN PURSUIT OF PRIVACY: LAW, ETHICS AND THE RISE OF 
TECHNOLOGY 12 (Cornell U. Press 1997) (stating that “virtually all animals seek periods of 
individual seclusion or small group intimacy,” and this inclination toward privacy serves “various 
biological purposes, especially those of ensuring propagation of the species”). 
 217. Alan Westin, The Origins of Modern Claims to Property, in PHILOSOPHICAL 
DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY 56, 57–58 (Ferdinand Schoeman ed., Cambridge U. Press 1984) 
(indicating that a lack of privacy can disrupt nest building and rearing of young); WILLIAM 
HORNADAY, OUR VANISHING WILD LIFE: ITS EXTERMINATION AND PRESERVATION 322 
(Scribner 1913) (“Every breeding wild animal craves seclusion and immunity from excitement 
and all forms of molestation.  Nature demands this as her unassailable right.”). 
 218. E.g., Robyn Boyd, Fact or Fiction?  Birds (and Other Critters) Abandon Their Young at 
the Slightest Human Touch, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN (July 26, 2007), https://www.scientificamerica 
n.com/article/fact-or-fiction-birds-abandon-young-at-human-touch/ (noting that birds may aban-
don their nests in response to human disturbance, although this abandonment may only be 
temporary; rabbits may abandon their nests altogether). 
 219. Professor Brett Mills at the University of East Anglia stressed that documentary 
filmmakers should not intrude in animals dens or burrows for this reason.  UNIVERSITY OF EAST 
ANGLIA, Animals’ Right to Privacy Denied by Wildlife Documentary Makers, Academic Says, 
SCIENCE DAILY (Apr. 29, 2010), https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2010/04/100429092934 
.htm (“For example, many species could be read as desiring not to be seen—animals in burrows 
and nests have constructed a living space which equates with the human concept of a home, and 
commonly do this in locations which are, by their very nature, explicitly hidden, often for practical 
purposes.”). 
 220. Wildlife experts recognize that privacy is crucial for healing.  E.g., SAFEWINGS BIRD 
SANCTUARY, About Us, UK SAFARI, www.uksafari.com/safewings/aboutus.htm (last visited on 
July 20, 2016) (mentioning that healing from injury requires privacy from human intrusion); 
HORNADAY, supra note 223, at 322 (arguing that when an animal “is struggling to recuperate, it 
deserves to be left entirely unmolested”) (emphasis in original). 
 221. Ella Davies, Which Animal is the Stealthiest Hunter on the Planet?, BBC.COM (Dec. 22, 
2015), http://www.bbc.com/earth/story/20151222-which-animal-is-the-deadliest-hunter-on-the-pl 
anet (observing that some animals are stealthy hunters and “rely on the element of surprise to 
catch their prey”). 
 222. Lenore Garon, Protecting Privacy in Credit Reporting, 24 STAN. L. REV. 550,  554 (1972) 
(discussing basic biological necessity for privacy among many species of animals). 
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B.  Privacy as Legally Cognizable Penumbra 
The law should protect animals’ privacy from human 
encroachment because privacy implicates the same concerns as those 
underlying the statutes protecting animals’ health.  In other words, 
protecting animals’ privacy is a penumbral implication of the current 
laws protecting animals’ welfare and bodily integrity.223  In the legal 
context, the term penumbral refers to an emanation from a plain 
provision in existing law.  The basic concept is that a penumbral 
implication is so intertwined with other more straightforward 
provisions that it ought to be enforceable alongside those provisions.224 
Using penumbral analysis to infer a legal basis for wildlife privacy 
seems sensible because human privacy also derives from a penumbra.  
In Griswold v. Connecticut,225 the Supreme Court discerned a human 
right to privacy even though the Constitution does not expressly 
mention privacy.226  The Court in Griswold found that privacy is a 
penumbra of other rights expressly set forth in the Constitution.227  
According to the Court, specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have 
penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that give 
them life and substance. The Court relied on this penumbra to strike 
down a state statute that criminalized the use of contraception.228  The  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 223. The word penumbra means “partially shaded outer region of the shadow cast by an 
opaque object.” This definition of penumbra appears in the online version of the Oxford English 
Dictionary, www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/penumbra (last visited 
on July 20, 2016). 
 224. See Benjamin Zipursky, Practical Positivism Versus Practical Perfectionism: The Hart-
Fuller Debate at Fifty, 839 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1170, 1176 (2008) (noting that penumbral analysis 
entails considering “the goals of the law” as evident in the language used in the law). 
 225. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 226. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (“The Constitution does not explicitly mention 
any right of privacy.”).  See SONU BEDI, REJECTING RIGHTS 146–47 (Cambridge Press 2009) 
(indicating that “the modern right to privacy has little textual basis in the Constitution”). 
 227. 381 U.S. at 484. The constitutional guarantees giving rise to the penumbra of privacy 
included the following: the First Amendment’s provisions guaranteeing freedom of association; 
the Third Amendment’s protection against quartering of soldiers; the Fourth Amendment’s 
safeguard against unreasonable searches and seizures; and the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition of 
compulsory self-incrimination.  Id. 
 228. Id. at 485. 
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Court later embraced penumbral reasoning in a series of other cases 
regarding privacy,229 including Roe v. Wade.230 
While penumbral reasoning is most prominently invoked in the 
context of constitutional jurisprudence,231 it also applies to statutory 
interpretation.232  Even H.L.A. Hart, the famous advocate of legal 
positivism,233 argued that penumbral analysis of statutes is appropriate 
in certain circumstances.234  Hart wrote that a court should faithfully 
apply the “core of settled meaning” in a statute, but should also apply 
the principles underlying the statute to adjudicate the “penumbra of 
debatable cases.”235  For example, a statute forbidding vehicles in a 
park would logically extend to prohibit bicycles, roller skates and toy 
cars in that park.236  Extension of the statute to cover additional matters 
 
 229. Spears, supra note 19 (noting that Griswold brought the term “penumbra” into the 
national lexicon, “and since its issuance has served as an important basis on which other significant 
privacy rulings have relied”); see BEDI, supra note 226, at 148, 156 (discussing role of Griswold’s 
privacy right in later cases permitting abortion and consensual homosexual relations). 
 230. 410 U.S. at 152.  There is some irony in attempting to derive a doctrine of wildlife privacy 
from the penumbral reasoning that protects human reproductive freedom.  The pro-life 
movement and the animal rights movement are arguably similar in that they seek to extend rights 
beyond what current law considers to be the limits of the human realm.  For a fascinating 
discussion of this parallel, see SHERRY COLB & MICHAEL DORF, BEATING HEARTS: ABORTION 
AND ANIMAL RIGHTS 2 (2016). 
 231. Brandon Denning & Glenn Reynolds, Comfortably Penumbral, 77 B.U. L. REV. 1089, 
1120 (1997) (noting increased use of penumbras in constitutional interpretation by liberal and 
conservative justices); Glenn Reynolds, Penumbral Reasoning on the Right, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 
1333, 1120 (1992) (observing that right-wing jurists engage in penumbral interpretation even as 
the right ostensibly advocates strict interpretation and reliance on original intent); but see Alex 
Kozinski & Eugene Volokh, A Penumbra Too Far, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1639, 1647 (1993) 
(criticizing penumbral interpretation, and suggesting that results could be “perilous”). 
 232. “The concept of penumbra is commonly used in resolving questions of constitutional and 
statutory interpretation.” Brief of Appellant Max C. Maloney at 30, Maloney v. Valley Medical 
Authorities, 946 A.2d 702 (Pa. Super Ct. 2007) (No. 346 WDA 2007) (emphasis added). See, e.g., 
Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 457 (1957) (“Other problems will lie in the 
penumbra of express statutory mandate.  Some will lack express statutory sanction but will be 
solved by looking at the policy of the legislation and fashioning a remedy that will effectuate that 
policy.”). 
 233. In a nutshell, positivists believe that interpretation of law should depend on the law itself, 
not on extrinsic concepts of morality or “natural law.”  Zipursky, supra note 231. 
 234.  See H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 77 HARV. L. REV. 
593, 607 (1958). 
 235. Id. 
 236. Anthony D’Amato has explained Hart’s example involving the statute forbidding 
vehicles.   
Each statute, according to Hart, has a core and a penumbra, and thus his theory is a 
general one.  In line with his positivist predecessors, Hart considers the court’s ability to 
transform the penumbral part of the message as authorized by delegation from the 
legislature.  In other words, when a legislature passes a statute, it is saying to the court: 
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not explicitly mentioned is necessary to achieve the underlying goals of 
the statute. 
In a similar manner, protecting animals’ privacy is essential  to 
achieve the goals underlying animal welfare statutes.  As noted 
previously, privacy is vital for animals’ health because it provides 
opportunities for hunting, mating, rearing offspring, resting, and 
recuperating from injury.237  Just as a statute prohibiting disruption in 
a park should logically extend beyond vehicles to other vehicle-like 
equipment, so too should a legislative scheme protecting animal 
welfare protect animals’ privacy, which is indispensable to their 
welfare. 
There are many ways in which practical rules could express the 
doctrine of animal privacy.  The most straightforward approach would 
be for legislatures to amend their animal welfare statutes in order to 
protect privacy.  Courts could also employ penumbral reasoning to 
derive privacy protections from the more general language in current 
animal welfare statutes.  As Judge Posner has noted, the cause of 
animal protection would benefit from characterizing its objectives as 
closely related to objectives that judges and lawmakers already 
consider legitimate.238  The importance of privacy (at least for humans) 
is one of the few principles on which virtually all legislators and judges 
agree.239  Protecting privacy with procedural rules limiting government 
 
transmit the core portion of this message intact, but you are hereby delegated to 
‘legislate’ or otherwise be creative (i.e., add information) with respect to the penumbral 
portion of this message. [In the case of statute prohibiting vehicles in the park,] the term 
‘vehicle’ might cast a wider net than simply encompassing the automobile.  This Hart 
calls the area of the ‘penumbra.’  The penumbra might include bicycles, roller skates, 
toy automobiles that are battery propelled, or airplanes.  
ANTHONY D’AMATO, JURISPRUDENCE: A DESCRIPTIVE AND NORMATIVE ANALYSIS OF LAW 
132–33 (1984) (brackets added). 
 237. See supra note 222–38 and accompanying text. 
 238. Judge Posner has suggested that animal advocates would be more likely to succeed if 
“departures from existing law are treated as applications of it guided by analogy or deduction.”  
Supra note 209 at 533.  These advocates should not overlook “an approach to the question of 
animal welfare that is more conservative, methodologically as well as politically, but possibly 
more efficacious, than rights-mongering.  That is simply to extend, and more vigorously enforce, 
laws designed to prevent gratuitous cruelty to animals.”  Id. at 539. 
 239. Jeffrey Rosen, a law professor at George Washington, has observed that, “conservative 
and liberal justices have joined in unexpected alliances, proving that on the Supreme Court, as on 
Capitol Hill, privacy is a cross-cutting, bipartisan issue.”  Jeffrey Rosen, A Victory for Privacy, 
WALL ST. J., June 18, 2001, at A.18.  See also Craig Bradley, “Knock and Talk” and the Fourth 
Amendment, 84 INDIANA L. J. 1099, 1099 (2009) (noting that Republican appointees on the 
Supreme Court have surprisingly similar to Democratic appointees in their zeal to protect privacy; 
they have demanded warrants for even “minor intrusions” that infringe privacy rights); e.g., Joint 
letter from Senator Chuck Grassley, chairman, and Patrick Leahy, ranking member, U.S. Senate 
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intrusion is a familiar task for legislators and judges.  They have already 
formulated extensive rules to protect privacy in the context of criminal 
investigations.  The next Part considers the possibility of importing and 
adapting some of these rules. 
V.  BORROWING REQUIREMENTS FOR INFRINGEMENT OF HUMAN 
PRIVACY 
Currently, a legal patchwork governs the surveillance of wildlife.240  
This article argues that it is time to take animals’ privacy seriously by 
establishing a uniform, comprehensive, and predictable set of rules for 
the use of surveillance collars on wild animals. Such rules should 
prescribe the procedure and limitations for monitoring wildlife, and 
should set forth penalties for misuse of surveillance information. 
The rules that protect human privacy during criminal 
investigations provide a useful model.  Of course, it would be 
inappropriate to import the exact same rules to the context of wildlife 
surveillance.  No one would argue that the government should read 
Miranda warnings to animals or seek their consent for searches.  
However, the analogous example of criminal procedure deserves 
careful consideration for several reasons.  First, the surveillance 
technology used in the wilderness derives from investigations of human 
criminals and spies.241  Second, the rules of criminal investigation are 
familiar not only to judges, lawyers, and police, but also throughout 
popular culture.  This familiarity might improve the likelihood of 
compliance and the consistency of application.  Third, the ample case 
law addressing the fine points of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence 
could provide analogous—if not on-point—authority guiding the 
implementation of rules for wildlife surveillance.  Finally, the cross-
application of rules protecting human privacy may reduce speciesism 
and increase humans’ appreciation for animals’ privacy. 
The best way to safeguard wildlife privacy, like human privacy, is 
 
Judiciary Comm., to Attorney Gen. Eric Holder (Jan. 22, 2015) (expressing bipartisan disapproval 
of investigative tactics that infringed privacy). 
 240. See supra, Part III. 
 241. Benson, supra note 4 (recounting that wildlife biologists derived their surveillance 
technology from investigations of crime and espionage).  At the present time, wildlife biologists 
are not only using this high-tech investigative techniques to learn about wildlife behavior, but also 
to investigate possible crimes by humans against wildlife.  U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERV., About 
the Laboratory, https://www.fws.gov/lab/about.php (last visited on July 22, 2016) (explaining that 
lab uses advanced forensics technology to solve cases in which animals seem to be victims of 
human crimes). 
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with “bright-line rules.”  These rules are predictable and help officials 
readily discern all the boundaries limiting their conduct.242  Because 
bright-line rules are necessary to protect privacy, penumbral analysis 
does not usually play a significant role in enforcing the privacy rules on 
a day-to-day basis.  In other words, it is not necessary to cite the 
underlying rationale for a bright-line rule and then argue why a 
particular application of the rule would serve that rationale.243  For 
example, a ban on contraception violates human privacy whether or 
not the claimant has experienced the same sort of harm that led to 
passage of the First Amendment’s guarantee of free speech, the Third 
Amendment’s prohibition of quartering soldiers, the Fourth 
Amendment’s protection against unreasonable searches, or the Fifth 
Amendment’s right against self-incrimination, even though the right of 
privacy emanates as a penumbra from these four constitutional 
provisions.244  So too must the doctrine of animal privacy have a life of 
its own, free of any requirement that violations must be linked to the 
health concerns giving rise to the penumbra.  Protection of wildlife 
privacy must be intrinsically important.  Health concerns may be the 
original rationale for the penumbra, but they do not set the limits of 
animal privacy.  If application of the doctrine depended on proof of 
health risks in each instance, the analysis would be too speculative and 
the protection provided by the doctrine would be inconsistent.  A 
bright-line rule would not be very bright if its application were so 
contingent. 
 
 242. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1179–80 
(1989) (arguing that bright-line rules are preferable because they improve predictability and 
consistency). 
 243. Justice Scalia, who has been one of the strongest proponents of bright-line rules, has 
expressed his disapproval of “reasoning that abstracts from the right to its purposes,” because 
such reasoning could make the interpretation of a rule inconsistent, and could even undermine or 
eliminate the right at issue.  Scalia, J., dissenting, Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 862 (1990) 
(criticizing the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence under the Confrontation Clause for abstracting 
from the confrontation right to its purposes, and then determining the right was unnecessary in a 
particular case because it would not achieve the underlying purposes in that case).  Scalia’s 
majority opinion in Crawford v. Washington offered an illustration that showed the merit of this 
argument: a judge should not assume that the right to a jury trial is instrumental to the goal of 
discovering the truth, and then dispense with the defendant’s right to a jury trial when he seems 
to be obviously guilty.  541 U.S. 36, 60 (2004).  Bright-line rules must be more secure and must be 
immune to consequentialist analysis. 
 244. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484 (explaining how the right of privacy that led to invalidation of 
Connecticut’s statute criminalizing contraception emerged as a penumbra from the first, third, 
fourth and fifth amendments, but not requirement any showing that the ban on contraception 
directly violated those four amendments or implicated the concerns that led to passage of those 
amendments). 
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It is beyond the scope of this Article to determine whether 
statutes, regulations, or judicial rules would provide the best vehicle for 
protection of animals’ privacy.  A significant amount of scholarship has 
already addressed the relative merits of these different approaches.245  
Assuming uniform enforcement might be possible, the remainder of 
this Part will focus on the substance of the proposed rules. 
A.  Balancing of Particularized Need vs. Privacy Interest 
Criminal investigations generally may not infringe human privacy 
without a showing that the infringement is reasonable.246  Absent a 
categorical rule for investigations in particular settings such as airports 
or prisons, reasonableness turns on a balancing of the government’s 
particularized need for information against the privacy interest of the 
suspect or class of suspects.247  This same balancing should be necessary 
for the use of surveillance collars on wildlife.  Specifically, a wildlife 
biologist or manager should submit a written application setting forth 
the rationale for the monitoring.248  The requirement of a written 
submission imposes discipline on the applicant to take account of 
competing interests, and creates a record for later reference if the 
propriety of the surveillance is ever in doubt.249  The grounds for 
 
 245. David Steinberg, Sense-Enhanced Searches and the Irrelevance of the Fourth 
Amendment, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 465, 471–79 (2007) (comparing the institutional 
competence of legislatures and courts to protect privacy against modern surveillance techniques); 
Orin Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Cause 
for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 857–82 (2004) (arguing the same). 
 246. Akil Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 4 HARV. L. REV. 107 at 758 (explaining 
that the Fourth Amendment requires that all searches and seizures be reasonable). 
 247. David Gray and Danielle Cintron, The Right to Quantitative Privacy, 98 MINN. L. REV. 
62, 107 (2013) (“‘reasonableness’ requires balancing the legitimate interests of law enforcement 
against the privacy interests of citizens”). 
 248. Institutional animal care and use committees (IACUCs) sometimes review applications 
for surveillance, but the requirements for these applications are not sufficiently standardized, and 
the use of surveillance collars does not always require review by IACUCs.  See supra notes 168–
75. 
 249. John Taylor, Using Suppression Hearing Testimony to Prove Good Faith under United 
States v. Leon, 54 KAN. L. REV. 155, 157 (2005) (contending that “the process of preparing a 
warrant application also imposes on police officers the valuable discipline of having to sit down 
and write out precisely why they believe they have probable cause to search”; suggesting further 
that “the effort to justify a search to a neutral third party causes police to exercise greater care in 
their probable cause judgments”); see Priscilla Smith, When Machines Are Watching: How 
Warrantless Use of GPS Surveillance Technology Violations the Fourth Amendment Right against 
Unreasonable Searches, 121 YALE L. J. FORUM, OCT. 11, 2011 (“Even if judges grant warrants for 
GPS surveillance liberally, the requirement that law enforcement authorities justify each use of 
surveillance prevents them from multiply this monitoring by millions.”). 
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surveillance should include some discussion of benefits to the 
particular animal that will wear the surveillance equipment, or in the 
absence of such individual benefits, the significant collective benefits 
that will accrue to the population of animals including the animal under 
surveillance.250  The application should not rest entirely on the past 
value of surveillance, because scientific research has cumulative 
benefits, and scientists do not need to repeat past experiments to 
validate their findings.251  The authority reviewing each application 
should use what economists refer to as “marginal analysis”252 focusing 
on whether surveillance of the next animal would bring benefits 
exceeding the costs. 
B.  Consideration of Less Intrusive Alternatives 
In criminal investigations, the government cannot use the most 
intrusive types of investigative techniques, such as wiretaps, without 
demonstrating that less intrusive strategies would be insufficient.253  A 
similar requirement should apply to wildlife surveillance.  Like a 
wiretap, a surveillance collar is one of the most intrusive tools that the 
government can use in an investigation: it gives investigators access to 
a vast amount of intimate data on an ongoing basis.254  Thus, the 
government should reserve this particular tool for circumstances in 
which less intrusive tools are insufficient.  In the case of wolf 
surveillance, several other less intrusive techniques are available that 
could avoid the need for a telemetry collar.  These techniques include 
analysis of scat255 and footprints,256 visual monitoring by wildlife 
 
 250. Joslin, supra note 83, at 216 (arguing that wildlife biologists should not capture and collar 
animals “unless there is a reasonable expectation that the results will have some potential positive 
benefit for the animals involved”). 
 251. See upra note 80 (raising doubts about incremental value of scientific data obtained from 
surveillance collars); Lewis, supra note 127, at 9 (questioning the value of this data) 
 252. PAUL KRUGMAN, ET AL,, ESSENTIALS OF ECONOMICS 202 (Macmillan 2010) (defining 
marginal analysis as consideration of incremental benefits and costs). 
 253. Stephen Arthur and Robert Hunter, Wiretapping Evidence, 1 FED. TRIAL HANDBOOK: 
CRIMINAL § 29:3 (2015) (explaining that government may not use a wiretap unless other 
investigative techniques would be inadequate). 
 254. See supra notes 59–61 and accompanying text. 
 255. Rebecca Kessler, Catch a Whiff? Device Aims to Reveal Age, Gender, and Identity of 
Endangered Wolves from the Scent of Their Poop, ENVTL. NEWS, June 11, 2015 (discussing 
technology that can identify individual wolves with 94% accuracy based on analysis of scat); e.g., 
John O’Connell, Biologist Changing the Way Wolves Are Tracked, CAPITAL PRESS, Dec. 4, 2015 
(reporting that the Idaho Department of Fish and Game is beginning to rely on scat analysis in 
additional to telemetry in tracking wolves). 
 256. Zoe Jewell and Sky Alibhai of Duke University have promoted a noninvasive technique 
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biologists and managers on the ground,257 or the use of a “howl box” to 
determine the presence of wolves in the vicinity.258  If the purpose of 
collaring wolves is to keep them away from livestock, there are many 
other potentially viable alternatives.259  Only when the government 
demonstrates that these less intrusive techniques would be insufficient 
should the use of surveillance collars be permissible.260 
C.  Minimization 
When obtaining permission to use highly intrusive surveillance 
techniques such as wiretaps in criminal investigations, the government 
must minimize both the scope and duration of the surveillance.  For 
example, a wiretap order usually directs police to conclude all 
monitoring within 90 days and stop listening to a phone conversation 
once it becomes clear that the topic of the conversation is not germane 
to the investigation.261  Similar boundaries are appropriate for the use 
of surveillance collars on wildlife.  For example, permits for 
surveillance should have a finite duration; a period of a few months 
should be the default unless the applicant makes a compelling showing 
for a longer period.  The present practice of indefinite surveillance—
 
that relies on footprint analysis to identify wild animals. See http://wildtrack.org/ (last visited on 
July 24, 2016). 
 257. Andrews, supra note 10 (indicating that traditional wildlife tracking may be preferable 
to telemetry collars in certain circumstances, because observations on the ground can gather a 
wider range of information). 
 258. A howl box emits the sound of a wolf’s howl and records responses by any wolves in the 
facility.  Each response is distinctive and allows researchers to keep track of individual wolves.  
Guthrie, supra note 88 (indicating that the howl box is efficient, inexpensive and less intrusive, so 
it is “an improvement over existing devices”). 
 259. Stephens, supra note 33, at 951–52 (“Perhaps the most effective, and ultimately the most 
intuitive, is to reduce the number of attractions for the wolves.  Quick and effective handling of 
dead, diseased, or dying livestock and the management of calving, which are all enticing to 
predators, can significantly reduce the chance of attracting wolves.  The use of guard dogs has 
also been shown to be an effective measure in preventing wolf predation as the canine presence 
may act as a deterrent, and dogs can be effective in alerting humans when predators enter the 
area.  The use of barriers such as permanent or portable fencing and fladry, the hanging of red or 
orange cloth flags at eighteen-inch intervals along a thin rope, have proven effective under a 
variety of circumstances . . . .  Range riders patrol livestock herds, keeping track of their location 
with respect to the are wolf packs, and taking proactive measures such as removing carcasses 
quickly.  Their presence is generally effective in deterring wolves from entering the area, as wolves 
actively avoid humans.”). 
 260. In Australia, the ethical rules for radio tracking direct wildlife managers to “[u]se 
alternative methods whenever possible.”  Radio Tracking Wildlife Research, ANIMAL ETHICS 
INFOLINK, www.animalethics.org.au/policies-and-guideliens/widlife-research/radio-tracking (last 
visited on July 11, 2016) (setting forth various guidelines for the use of radio tracking devices). 
 261. Arthur and Hunter, supra note 253 (discussing minimization requirement). 
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continuing until the demise of the wolf or the batteries—allows for 
privacy violations that are too attenuated from the original rationale 
for surveillance.262  Additionally, researchers should make use of new 
remote-release technology that frees a wolf from its collar upon 
expiration of a preprogrammed time period or receipt of an electronic 
signal from a remote location.263  Researchers should also stop utilizing 
data from an active surveillance collar during time periods when the 
rationale for surveillance is inapplicable.  For instance, in a research 
project focusing on wolves’ possible predation of an endangered 
species in area A, researchers should not monitor the signals from 
collars when the wolves are far away in area B.  Just as in the case of a 
wiretap, the propriety of collar surveillance depends on dynamic 
circumstances.  The initial order should not provide carte blanche for 
ongoing surveillance at the sole discretion of the researchers. 
D.  Review by Neutral, Detached Authority 
Police seeking to infringe human privacy in a criminal 
investigation—for example, by conducting surveillance in an area such 
as a residence—must first obtain authorization from a judicial 
officer.264  Involving a neutral, detached official in screening 
applications for such surveillance provides a system of checks and 
balances that safeguards privacy.265  If officers were not accountable to 
a neutral third party, their haste or institutional interests might lead 
them to undervalue the privacy of the subjects under investigation.266  
 
 262. See, e.g., Mark Freeman, OR-7 Could Be Recollared Next Month, MEDFORD MAIL 
TRIBUNE, Aug. 24, 2014 (indicating that Oregon’s most famous wolf, OR-7, had worn the same 
surveillance collar for three and a half years). 
 263. Surveillance collars are now available that drop off automatically when they receive a 
signal from the researcher or manager who is monitoring data from the collar.  E.g,, website of 
Lotek Fish and Wilderness Monitoring, www.lotek.com/dropoff.htm (last visited on July 24, 2016) 
(explaining that drop-off mechanism avoids the need for recapture in order to remove the collar). 
 264. There are exceptions to the warrant requirement for certain settings in which people 
have a diminished expectation of privacy, such as schools, prisons, automobiles, border 
checkpoints, airports, heavily regulated industries, etc.  See JOSHUA DRESSLER AND ALAN 
MICHAELS, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE VOL. 1: INVESTIGATION 297–317 (2010). 
 265. Id. at 161 (summarizing the law and indicating that “if people are going to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects from unreasonable searches and seizures, as the Fourth 
Amendment guarantees, a neutral party—the judge, and not the police officer (no, for that 
matter, the person whose privacy or security is at risk)—should make the initial determination 
whether there is sufficient basis to intrude on an individual’s security”). 
 266. Mona Shokrai, Double-Trouble: The Underregulation of Surreptitious Video Surveillance 
in Conjunction with the Use of Snitches in Domestic Government Investigations, 13 RICHMOND J. 
L. & TECH. 3, 55 (2006) (indicating that requirement of authorization by neutral, detached officer 
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In the case of wildlife biologists, the vast majority have noble interests, 
but some are unduly enthusiastic about the use of surveillance 
collars.267  This enthusiasm might desensitize them to the importance 
of wildlife privacy.  Whereas police officers know they will eventually 
face the scrutiny of a defense attorney in an adversarial proceeding if 
their seized evidence leads to prosecution, it is unlikely that wildlife 
researchers will ever be subjected to such legal scrutiny in representing 
the interests of the wildlife they have monitored.  These circumstances 
heighten the need for outside review at the outset of the investigation.  
The requirement of review by an IACUC, while not universally 
applicable, demonstrates that Congress recognizes the value of 
external accountability for researchers who work with animals.268  Such 
a requirement should extend to all uses of wildlife surveillance 
collars.269 
E.  Return and Inventory 
In the criminal justice system, a police officer who obtains a search 
warrant must provide the issuing authority with a “return and 
inventory” after executing the warrant.270  In other words, the officer 
must report on what the search found.271  This procedure provides an 
incentive for candor and caution in applications, because the results 
may contradict an exaggerated argument for a search.  Requiring a 
“return and inventory” also helps to educate the official who is 
determining whether to issue search warrants.  The official can learn 
about the patterns of criminal activity in the area and the 
trustworthiness of officers who frequently apply for warrants.  
Importing the same requirements to animal surveillance would 
improve the accountability of applicants and help the issuing 
authorities learn more about the tendencies of the animals under 
surveillance.  In time, these safeguards could reduce surveillance to a 
 
reduces potential for police bias in favor of surveillance); see Smith, supra note 243 (discussing 
importance of warrant requirement in “placing a check on the unlimited discretion otherwise 
afforded officers,” and thereby reducing abuse of surveillance technology”); Phyllis Bookspan 
Reworking the Warrant Requirement: Resuscitating the Fourth Amendment, 44 VANDERBILT L. 
REV. 473, 529 (1991) (arguing that judicial review “counterattacks the passions of the moment”). 
 267. Supra, notes 68–76 and accompanying text. 
 268. Supra, note 167. 
 269. Currently the involvement of IACUCs is not mandatory for all use of surveillance collars 
on wildlife.  See supra notes 159–73 and accompanying text. 
 270. FED. R. CRIM. PROC. 41(f) (requiring return and inventory). 
 271. Id. 
Lininger - For Publication (Do Not Delete) 6/7/2017  1:30 PM 
256 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. XXVII:207 
minimum and best protect animals’ privacy.  The compilation of all 
these reports in a central database would reduce the likelihood of 
duplicative research, and would thereby help to reduce surveillance in 
the long run.272 
F.  Separate Regulation of Restraint on Movement 
Police officers who obtain permission to conduct long-term 
electronic surveillance do not have blanket authorization to imprison 
any person they encounter during that surveillance.273  Similarly, when 
wildlife researchers obtain a permit to use surveillance collars for 
monitoring wildlife, this permit should not automatically authorize 
researchers to immobilize, capture and move the animals however they 
see fit.  Wolves naturally migrate, which suggests limitations on their 
range could be harmful to their health.274  The issuing authority should 
generally disfavor the use of collars with tranquilizer darts and only 
allow the use such collars in a permit with a clearly defined list of 
contingencies that would warrant immobilization.  The wholesale 
movement or enclosure of a wildlife population should require entirely 
separate authorization.  Shock collars are so inconsistent with our 
understanding of “wildness” that it is hard to imagine any justification 
for the use of such a technique on a wild animal. In any event, judicial 
authorization should be necessary. 
G.  Prohibition of Lethal Measures Absent Exigency 
No police officer would assume that a surveillance warrant carries 
with it the authorization to execute the person who is the subject of the 
surveillance.  Oddly, however, some wildlife managers, who collar 
wolves for the ostensible reason of protecting them later, use the 
collars to track down and kill the same wolves when management 
objectives change.275  Laws should forbid the use of surveillance collars 
 
 272. See Joslin, supra note 83, at 216 (arguing that wildlife biologists should refrain from 
additional capturing and collaring of wild animals except when this intervention is absolutely 
necessary to achieve beneficial results for the animals). 
 273. Detaining a person suspected of criminal activity requires that an officer reasonably 
suspect his criminality or otherwise have probable cause to arrest him.  Whren v. United States, 
517 U.S. 806 at 809 (reciting that defendants alleged that their arresting officer lacked reasonable 
suspicion or probable cause to seize their vehicle).  Absent indicia supporting either belief, a 
surveilled person cannot be detained by an officer. 
 274. See Jewell, supra, note 103 (indicating that limitations on movement can harm wolves’ 
health). 
 275. See Ketcham supra, note 108. 
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to kill wolves unless separate authorization is obtained from the same 
issuing authority.  If the issuing authority determines that the 
surveillance application was a ruse to enable the killing of the subject 
wolves,276 the authority should immediately require the remote release 
of the collars in question.  Hopefully, the policy of minimization277 
would reduce the opportunistic use of high-tech surveillance gear for 
the purpose of stalking and killing collared animals.  There are few 
spectacles in wildlife management that are more shameful—and more 
unsportsmanlike—than the shooting of a collared wolf by a wildlife 
manager who once purported to protect the wolf.  Of course, the killing 
of a collared animal would still be permissible if that animal poses an 
imminent lethal threat to a human being (a circumstance that also 
permits the use of deadly force against a human suspect under current 
law).278 
H.  Sanctions for Noncompliance 
Consistent enforcement of bright-line rules is necessary to protect 
against invasions of privacy.279  In the context of criminal investigations, 
police officers who violate rules for searches and surveillance face a 
range of penalties.  This includes suppression at trial of any evidence 
that is the “fruit of the poisonous tree.”280  Animals have no standing 
to sue281 and few trials rely on evidence derived from surveillance of 
animals. Therefore, a different set of penalties is necessary to assure 
compliance with wildlife surveillance rules.  Sanctions could include 
fines and “suppression” of data via a court injunction against 
publication or dissemination.282  Courts might also enjoin further 
 
 276. Some critics have suggested that Idaho’s unauthorized use of surveillance collars in 2016 
was such a ruse.  See Bourdeaux supra, note 159. 
 277. The minimization requirement would limit the duration of permissible surveillance, and 
would reduce the number of collared wolves at any given instant in time. Freeman, supra note 
262. 
 278. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985). 
 279. Joshua Levy, Towards a Brighter Fourth Amendment: Privacy and Technology Change, 
16 VA. J. L. & TECH. 499, 513 (2011) (urging that “bright line Fourth Amendment rules are the 
only way to adequately protect privacy against new technologies” because “such rules enable 
police to know precisely how far they can intrude when conducting an investigation and, 
importantly, where they cannot intrude”). 
 280. DRESSLER, supra note 271, at 347-92. 
 281. Babcock, supra note 188, at 18 (arguing that nature “cannot gain access to the courts to 
protect itself”). 
 282. An example of the suppression remedy is the order of the U.S. District Court that 
reviewed the state of Idaho’s unlawful use of surveillance collars on wolves in the Frank Church 
Wilderness.  See supra, n. 153-57.  The court not only enjoined future use of the surveillance 
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surveillance by the offending officials.  Courts could forbid such 
officials from venturing back into wilderness areas for a certain time 
period after their violations.  In an extreme case of willful failure to 
follow surveillance regulations, the court might even outfit the 
offending official with an electronic ankle bracelet to ensure against 
any return to the wilderness—a fitting penalty that would be likely to 
increase the official’s sensitivity to the intrusiveness of surveillance 
technology.283 
VI.  RESPONSES TO FORESEEABLE OBJECTIONS 
A number of objections to this Article’s arguments are likely.  One 
possible criticism is that the reduced use of surveillance collars could 
harm wolves.  Proponents of collaring argue that it is necessary for 
scientific research that will improve wolves’ odds of survival.284  The 
value of continued research based on animal telemetry is unclear, 
however.285  In fact, the use of collars sometimes results in inaccurate 
data because the collars distort wolves’ behavior.286 If scientists can 
demonstrate a particularized need for research involving collars and 
that the value of it would exceed the hardship on the wolves, the 
scientists could still obtain authorization for the research under the 
rules proposed in this Article.287  When collaring is not available, there 
are several alternate means of monitoring wolves, including visual 
observation, scat analysis, footprint tracking, and the utilization of 
“howl boxes.”288  Recent evidence suggests that collars are not 
necessary to keep wolves safe from people or other predators.  In 
Europe, where the density of human settlement is much higher than in 
 
collars on wolves in this area, but the court also ordered destruction of the data obtained from 
the collars up to that point.  According to U.S. District Judge B. Lynn Winmill, “The only remedy 
that will directly address the ongoing harm is an order requiring destruction of the data.”  
Wilderness Watch v. Vilsack, __ F.Supp. 3d ___, 2017 WL 241320 *9 (Jan. 18, 2017). 
 283. C.f. Samuel Wiseman, Pretrial Detention and the Right to Be Monitored, 123 YALE L. J. 
1344, 1364-82 (2014) (advocating the wider use of GPS tracking devices on humans in lieu of 
pretrial detention). 
 284. Sarah Skinner, Tracking Collars: The Good, the Bad, and the Necessary, California 
Wolves (Oct. 2, 2014), https://californiawolves.wordpress.com/2014/10/02/tracking-collars-the-
good-the-bad-and-the-necessary/ (arguing that a lone wolf being collared is “the best thing that 
could have happened” to it). 
 285. Jewell, supra note 179, at 505. 
 286. Id. at 502–05 (mentioning that invasive monitoring techniques can lead to misleading 
results because these techniques alter animals’ behavior;). 
 287. See Joslin, supra note 82, at 216. 
 288. Kessler, supra note 255; Jewell, supra note 256; Andrews, supra note 10; Guthrie, supra 
note 86. 
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the U.S., government officials do not rely as heavily on surveillance 
collars to manage wolves and the human and wolf populations manage 
to coexist peacefully.289 
Another foreseeable objection is that restricting the use of collars 
would increase wolves’ conflicts vís-a-vís humans and livestock.  But, 
wolves have almost never attacked humans290 and the practice of 
collaring wolves could lead to habituation that might draw wolves 
closer to human communities.291  Some authors suggest that ranchers 
have exaggerated predation of livestock by wolves;292 these authors 
also point out that coyotes and domestic dogs kill more livestock than 
do wolves.293  The strategy of collaring and culling wolves to reduce 
livestock predation could perhaps prove counterproductive, because 
disruption of packs sometimes leads to desperation that actually 
 
 289. Guillaume Chapron, et al., Recovery of Large Carnivores in Europe’s Modern Human-
Dominated Landscapes, SCIENCE MAGAZINE, (Dec. 2014) (reporting that European wolves are 
“successful in adapting to human-dominated landscapes”; these wolves are thriving even though 
“Europe hosts twice as many wolves as the contiguous United States . . . despite being half the 
size . . . and more than twice as densely populated”). 
 290.  “While people have a strong hatred for the animals, wolf contacts with humans are fairly 
rare and extremely unlikely to result in harm to the person.  In fact, a study of wolf-human 
encounters in Alaska and Canada (where the largest gray wolf populations exist) found that over 
the 100 years there have been fewer than twenty reported cases of unprovoked wolves attacking 
humans (out of eighty cases of published wolf-human interactions), none of which resulted in a 
fatality.  These findings suggest that humans may little to fear from wolves.”  Brandon Berrett, Is 
Defenders of Wildlife v. Salazar Correct that Successful State Management of Recovered Rocky 
Mountain Gray Wolves Is Not Compatible with the Endangered Species Act? 47 IDAHO L. REV. 
596, 598 (2011); see Whitney Stohr, Trophic Cascades and Private Property: The Challenges of a 
Regulatory Balancing Act and Lessons the UK Can Learn from the Reintroduction of the American 
Gray Wolf, 2 U. BALT. J. LAND & DEV. 15, 40 (2012) (“Folklore and exaggerated news reports 
are largely to blame for the public’s view of wolves as a danger to humans. Wolf attacks are 
extraordinarily rare . . .”); Craig Enochs, Gone Today, Here Tomorrow: Policy and Issues 
Surrounding Wildlife Reintroduction, 4 HASTINGS WEST-NORTHWEST J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 91, 
101 (1997) (“Rather than preying on humans, wolves actually avoid human contact”). 
 291. Duane, supra note 13; Klinkenborg, supra note 141 and accompanying text. 
 292. See, e.g., Stohr, supra note 290, at 47 (suggesting that “the frequency of livestock 
depredation by wolves is significantly exaggerated by those opposed to reintroduction 
programs”). 
 293. Wendy Keefover, Government Report: Less Than 1% of Cattle Killed by Native 
Carnivores and Domestic Dogs, HUFFINGTON POST, July 18, 2011 (“Less than a quarter of one 
percent, 0.23%, of the American cattle inventory was lost to native carnivores and dogs in 2010, 
according to a Department of Agriculture report released last week.  These findings call into 
question the tens of millions per year taxpayers and livestock growers spend on lethal control of 
native carnivores.  The government’s own data show that the real killers of cattle are not a few 
endangered wolves or other wildlife—they’re illness and weather.”); Thrower, supra note 31, at 
348 (“However, wolves are not the primary predators of livestock.  In both cattle and sheep 
deaths, U.S.D.A. statistics show that coyotes make up the majority carnivore group—domestic 
dogs come in second”). 
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increases predation on domesticated animals.294  Ranchers have many 
other less invasive means of protecting livestock from wolves.295  When 
wolves do attack livestock, environmental groups compensate ranchers 
for the value of lost animals.296 
Some might argue that it is inappropriate to extend rules designed 
for criminal investigations to the context of wildlife surveillance, in part 
because fish and game officials do not have an adversarial relationship 
with wildlife the way police are adversarial to suspected criminals.  
However, some state officials who utilize surveillance collars are 
indeed adversarial toward wolves.297  Even those who have genuine 
concern for helping wolves are sometimes too enthusiastic about 
surveillance collars and too insensitive to the hardships that this 
technology causes for collared animals.298  The extension of rules from 
criminal procedure to wildlife surveillance is not so incongruous, 
especially after wildlife biologists decided to import technology from 
the world of criminal investigation.  This Article does not impute bad 
faith to wildlife managers, nor does it deny them access to the 
technology for wildlife surveillance.  Rather, it proposes that the use of 
such technology should require proof of a particularized need, just as 
it does in the context of criminal investigation. 
Other critics might contend this Article does not go far enough, 
because it derives privacy from a statutory penumbra rather than 
insisting on the extension of rights to animals.  There can be no doubt 
that animal rights, if enshrined in law, would be more efficacious than 
the policies proposed in this Article.  The campaign for animal rights is 
commendable and finds no opposition here.  Others have criticized the 
movement, however.299  Even advocates for animals concede that legal 
 
 294. Robert Wieglas & Kaylie Peebles, Effects of Wolf Mortality on Livestock Depredations, 
PLOS ONE, Dec. 3, 2014 (reporting findings that wolf mortality disrupted packs and led 
remaining wolves to kill livestock that they otherwise would have avoided). 
 295. Stohr, supra note 290, at 40. 
 296. Id. at 47. (discussing compensation programs for ranchers who lose livestock to wolves). 
 297. Robbins, supra note 28; Fischman, supra note 29; Taibbi, supra note 30. 
 298. Fischman, supra note 29; Busch, supra note 74; Duane, supra note 13; Henson, supra note 
72; Benson, supra note 74. 
 299. As Judge Richard Posner declared in the Yale Law Journal, “There is a sad poverty of 
imagination in an approach to animal protection that can think of it only on the model of the civil 
rights movement.”  Posner, supra note 209, at 539.  “The most aggressive implementations of 
animal-rights thinking would undoubtedly benefit animals more [than incremental reform, but] 
those implementations are unlikely, so the modest alternatives are worth serious consideration.  
We may overlook this simple point, however much we love animals, if we listen too raptly to the 
siren song of ‘animal rights.’”  Id. at 541. 
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recognition of animal rights seems unlikely in the imminent future.300  
This Article aspires to help in the near term by laying a preliminary 
groundwork301 for recognizing wildlife privacy—a groundwork that a 
rights-based regime may one day supersede.  This Article’s policy-
based approach permits a broader analysis than does a rights-based 
approach.  As Professor Sonu Bedi has observed, the focus on rights 
can divert attention from the flawed rationale for government 
policies302 and advocates for wolves need to shine a light on the 
irrational justification for subjugation of these animals. 303 
A final possible criticism is that this Article errs by limiting its 
privacy doctrine to wildlife, excluding domesticated animals and 
livestock.  This Article does not purport to explore the full extent of 
the privacy doctrine.  As noted in the introduction, space does not 
permit a sweeping analysis of how the privacy doctrine might 
potentially affect other animals in different contexts.  This Article has 
focused on wildlife, in part because wild animals seem to have the 
strongest claim for privacy.  Future scholarship might address whether 
privacy should extend to livestock, household pets and zoo animals.304  
 
 300. Steven Wise “is the first to admit that his tactics haven’t proven successful so far.”  Lewis 
Beale, The Case for Treating Animals as Humans, THE DAILY BEAST, May 26, 2016, http:// 
www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2016/05/26/the-case-for-treating-animals-as-humans.html. Chris 
Green, executive director of Harvard’s Animal Law and Policy Program, is a former student of 
Wise and is a strong voice for animal protection.  He believes “the jury is still out” on animal 
rights.  Id. 
 301. Colb and Dorf criticize incrementalism in the context of advocacy for animal welfare, 
but do suggest that some principled incrementalism could be useful.  Supra note 237 at 143–45 
(generally expressing pessimism about viability of incrementalism as a strategy for reforming 
animal exploitation, but advocating “laws that reduce governmental support for harmful 
practices”; such advocacy amounts to “incremental-but-uncompromising activism”).  Green notes 
that some advocates for animal rights consider arguments for animal welfare to be akin to putting 
“nicer wallpaper at a prison,” but Green believes that arguments to improve the treatment of wild 
animals might have traction over the next five years.  See Beale supra note 300. 
 302. Bedi criticizes the preoccupation with rights, and suggests that scrutiny of the 
justification for policies could eliminate the need to resort to rights.  He offers the compelling 
example of morals legislation – that is, legislation lacking a justification in the prevention of 
demonstrable harm.  He argues that a privacy right should not be necessary to overturn a law 
forbidding consensual homosexual relations between adults, because the lack of justification for 
such a law should be a sufficient basis on which to overturn it.  The repudiation of improper 
justification renders the right obsolete.  BEDI, supra note 226, at 149. 
 303. Humans have persecuted wolves for centuries due in large part to irrational hatred.  
Klinkenborg, supra note 146 and accompanying text.  The currently pervasive use of surveillance 
collars is not always justifiable based on the demonstrable harm posed by unmonitored wolves 
(e.g., possible predation on humans and livestock).  Jewell, supra note 175 at 505 and 
accompanying text. 
 304. See, e.g., COLB, supra note 230, at 184–87 (raising questions about ethics of sterilizing 
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Perhaps animal privacy should be universal, or perhaps it should vary 
according to setting like human privacy does.305 
CONCLUSION 
It is fitting to close an article about lupine privacy by citing a case 
in which a Wolf was a party.  In Wolf v. Colorado, the Supreme Court 
insisted on safeguarding “the security of one’s privacy against arbitrary 
intrusion” by the government.306  Intrusive surveillance conducted 
“without authority of law but solely on the authority of police, did not 
need the commentary of recent history to be condemned . . .”307  Such 
surveillance offends one of the most basic principles on which 
Americans have agreed since the founding of this country: the 
government’s ability to intrude should depend on judicial 
authorization following a particularized showing of need. 
This Article has argued that wild animals deserve privacy—not the 
same degree of privacy that humans enjoy, but a lesser amount that is 
consistent with the seclusion and autonomy one would expect in the 
wild.  The experience of the gray wolf in the United States illustrates 
the danger of infringing privacy.  A doctrine of wildlife privacy derives 
naturally from statutes that protect the welfare of animals.  Decades of 
research have shown that privacy is indispensable to the wellbeing of 
animals. 
Implementing the doctrine of wildlife privacy requires that we 
borrow certain notions from the rules of criminal procedure.  These 
include the requirements of balancing government need versus privacy 
interests, showing the insufficiency of alternatives, minimizing 
surveillance to the extent possible, submitting applications for review 
 
companionate animals). 
 305. DRESSLER, supra note 264; United States v. Knotts, 480 U.S. 276, 281-82 (1983) 
(indicating that the legality of GPS surveillance depends on the location where the surveillance 
takes place, because people have more privacy in certain locations); see Timothy Horstmann, 
Protecting Traditional Privacy Rights in a Brave New Digital World: The Threat Posed by Digital 
Phone-Cameras and What States Should Do to Stop It, 111 PENN. ST. L. REV. 739. 746 (2007) 
(noting that, under one common view, “whether a person has an expectation of privacy depends 
on that person’s physical location”); cf. Kevin Winters, A Proposed Amendment to the Military 
Rules of Evidence on Inspections and the Probable Cause Search Standard for Operational Units, 
40 NAVAL L. REV. 143, 153 (1993) (“[A] man’s home is usually given greater constitutional 
protection than his prison cell; a child at home or on the street has greater constitutional 
protection than a child at school; and courts are loath to cloak automobiles with traditional fourth 
amendment protection.”). 
 306. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949). 
 307. Id. 
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by neutral third parties, and furnishing a report of the information 
obtained.  Other necessary reforms include a requirement of separate 
authorization for restraints on movement, as well as a prohibition on 
attaching surveillance collars simply to track and kill wolves.  The 
uniform adoption of such rules would help to establish the principle 
that privacy should be the norm in the wilderness. 
An animal is either wild or it is not.  The idea of partial wildness308 
is fanciful, like partial pregnancy or partial death.  We do have a word 
for the domesticated version of a wolf.  That animal is a dog.  A dog 
generally wears a collar.309 A wolf should not — absent a particularized, 
compelling justification that overrides the wolf’s privacy. 
 
 308. See Mooallem, supra note 103, at 4  (“We are gardening the wilderness”). 
 309. Appellee’s Answer Brief, Comins v. Van Voorhis, 2012 WL 12285258 *51 (Fla. App. 
Nov. 12, 2012) (challenging man’s claim that he shot a dog because he mistook it for a wolf; the 
collar showed the animal was “domesticated” and “belied” any claim that it might be a wolf). 
